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Abstract
This dissertation consists of four essays. The first article, entitled “The Unintended Consequences of
Bank Stress Tests”, analyzes the impact of recent bank examinations, known as stress tests on manage-
rial decisions. Stress tests are assessments conducted by regulators to determine whether banks have
sufficient capital buffers to withstand severe recessions. Unlike ordinary bank examinations, stress tests
involve forward-looking scenarios, and their results are publicly disclosed. This paper is the first study to
show the consequences of bank stress tests. My estimates indicate that there is a negative causal impact
of capital adequacy requirements on managerial decisions in the U.S. banking system. Managers make
real decisions regarding restructuring problematic loans or removing them entirely from their books.
Stress-tested banks reduce net loan charge-offs and keep problematic loans on their books to a greater
extent than banks in a non-tested group to meet the capital ratio requirements. Managers increase the
level of non-performing loans in the aftermath of stress tests announcement. Stress-tested banks with
greater exposure to the housing market change the classification of loan losses to a greater extent than
other banks. The study’s results remain robust using mid-sized banks that have been subject to the
latest rounds of stress tests. The second essay, entitled “The Lift of the Trade Embargo and Corporate
Policies: Evidence from the Immigrants’ Network” studies the causal effect of foreign competition on
corporate investment, cash holdings, financing and leverage decisions using the lift of the trade em-
bargo against Vietnam as an exogenous shock to product market competition. I exploit the random
allocation of Vietnamese refugees across the U.S. to establish the channels through which competition
affects corporate policies, financing decisions, and capital structure. U.S. corporations underinvest and
decrease leverage as a response to an increase in product market competition while increase research and
development expenditures and cash holdings. The impact lasts for the twelve years after the lift of the
trade embargo. Using a difference-in-differences method in combination with an instrumental variable
approach, I show that the immigrants’ network formed before the lift of the embargo is the channel
through which competition affects corporate policies. Corporations incorporated in states with higher
shares of Vietnamese immigrants cut their capital expenditures more than the corporations located in
the states with a lower share of Vietnamese immigrants. In particular, the immigrants’ network formed
by Vietnamese refugees play a significant role in transmitting the foreign competition shock to the U.S.
corporations. I find that the effect on capital expenditures exists only in textile industries in which
Vietnamese refugees are more involved and not any other industries. The third essay, entitled “The
Effect of Asymmetric Information on the Pricing of Equity Issuance” examines the adverse selection in
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the market for seasoned equity issuance. The asymmetric information can explain price reduction at the
date of equity issuance. Corporations prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the
quality of their company. This implies that equity issues tend to follow credible information releases.
I exploit brokerage mergers as a natural experiment that affects information asymmetry through their
effect on the extent of research coverage by sell-side equity analysts. The broker mergers cause brokers
operation to be terminated, and the level of analyst coverage decreases for the firms previously covered
by these analysts. I show when asymmetry in information increases, cumulative abnormal return is
positive around the date of equity issuance and is larger for stocks which lost analyst coverage rela-
tive to the control group of stocks. Besides, affected stocks issue more equity after the merger event
comparing to the control group. The final chapter entitled “The Role of Ownership in Privately Held
Firms: Evidence from the Financial Crisis” provides new evidence on the relationship between ownership
and corporate performance by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment from the recent financial crisis. I
evaluate differences in the performance of privately held corporations using a new and unexplored data
source on private firms in the US. I find that privately owned companies have a different performance
depending on their type of ownership. Using the 2007 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to the firm’s
liquidity, I show family owned firms outperform non-family owned companies in the aftermath of the
crisis while family firms have lower revenue in the regular periods. The empirical methodology employs a
difference-in-differences method to compare the revenue and employment growth of family owned versus
non-family owned firms controlling for time-invariant and firm-specific effects. The negative impact of
the financial crisis is larger on the non-family companies since these companies depend more on the
source of private financing from private equities and venture capitals while family-owned firms are more
likely to use their personal wealth to overcome the crisis. Overall, the results suggest that the intrinsic
characteristics of family-owned companies enable them to conquer the liquidity shortage during the crisis.
Having long-term investment horizon, risk aversion, and conservative behavior. Moreover, the existence
of lower agency cost in family-owned firms helps them to overcome the negative consequences of the
crisis and are the key to their success. Also, I conduct placebo tests to show the outperformance result
of family-owned firms appears only in the aftermath of the crisis and not in other normal periods.
iii
To my parents, Mahmoud, and Fatemeh, for their unconditional love. To my brother, Mehran and my
sister, Mehrnaz for their support. I hope that this achievement completes the dream that you had for
me and slightly compensates all your sacrifices during these years. Hoping that my father recovers and
may speak once again and says how much he is proud of me. Thank you all for believing in me.
iv
Acknowledgments
I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Heitor Almeida. I have been amazingly fortunate to have an advisor
who gave me the freedom to explore on my own, and at the same time the guidance to find the right
research path. Heitor introduced me to the world of corporate finance and taught me how to question my
thoughts, express ideas and gradually become an independent researcher. It is a great privilege to know
him and be his student. His insightful comments and constructive criticisms at different stages of my
research were thought-provoking, and they helped me focus my ideas and finish a project. I hope that
one day I would become as good an advisor to my students as Heitor has been to me. I am deeply grateful
to Dan Bernhardt for generously dedicating his time, expertise and knowledge throughout my graduate
studies. I am grateful to him for enforcing strict validations for each research result, and thus teaching
me how to do research and enrich my ideas. This dissertation would not have been possible without
his patient guidance and continuous support. I am also indebted to George Pennacchi, who taught me
asset pricing and banking. He worked tirelessly with me in the development of this dissertation. He
carefully read many drafts and provided excellent feedback throughout the process. I am grateful to
Charles Kahn, who is one of the best teachers that I have had in my life. He gave life to every theoretical
model of banking, and his teaching inspired me to work on a banking topic. I am indebted to him for
his continuous encouragement and guidance. I am grateful to Tatyana Deryugina for her support and
practical econometric advice. She has always been there to listen, read my reports and give comments
on my drafts. I have learned strength and consistency in research from her.
I am grateful for the support of many other professors at the University of Illinois who helped me
develop as an economist, including George Deltas, Elizabeth Powers, Rustom Irani, David Albouy, Hadi
Salehi Esfahani, Ali Toossi and Mark Borgschulte. I am also thankful to Carol Banks and Tera Martin
Roy at the economics department office for their kindness and support. I would also like to thank, Masoud
Nili, my graduate professor at the Sharif University of Technology who introduced me to economics, and
Mohammad Ali Saniee Monfared, who encouraged me to pursue graduate studies. This dissertation
would not have been possible without the love and support of my wonderful parents, brother and sister.
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Mahmoud, and Fatemeh, who live in Iran and
endure this far distance during six years of my graduate studies at the University of Illinois. With no
doubt, I would never become the person I am today without their endless sacrifices. My studies would
not have been possible without the sincere support of my brother, Mehran, who visited me regularly
during these years and my sister, Mehrnaz, and brother-in-law, Shahrokh, and niece, Tarannom.
v
Contents
Chapter 1 The Unintended Consequences of Bank Stress Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
III Data, Key Outcome Variables and Model Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B Key Outcome Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
IV Empirical Strategy and Matching Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B Matching Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C Model Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
V Variables and Pre-Regulation Distribution Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B Pre-Regulation Distribution Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
VI Validity of the Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
VII Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A Results of Stress Tests on Large Banks (SCAP 2009, CCAR 2011 and CCAR 2012) 16
B Results of Stress Tests on Mid-Sized Banks (DFAST 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
VIII Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Chapter 2 The Lift of the Trade Embargo and Corporate Policies: Evidence from
the Immigrants’ Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
II Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
III Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
IV Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
V Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
VI Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A Reduced Form Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
C OLS Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
D 2SLS Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
VII Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Chapter 3 The Effect of Asymmetric Information on the Pricing of Equity Issuance 63
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
II Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
III Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
IV Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
V Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Chapter 4 The Role of Ownership in Privately Held Firms: Evidence from the Fi-
nancial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
II Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
III Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
IV Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
V Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
vi
A Parallel Trend Assumption Between the Family-owned and NonFamily-owned Firms 81
B Evidence from the non-crisis periods: Placebo test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
VI Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
vii
Chapter 1
The Unintended Consequences of
Bank Stress Tests
I Introduction
“The Fed’s stress tests add risk to the financial system. Banks have a powerful incentive to get the
results the Fed wants and ignore other potential dangers.” Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2013. It is
now evident that in the years preceding the recent financial crisis, banks took excessive risks that were
not disclosed and regulators intervened only after panic spread across the financial system. Some have
argued that capital requirements enhance market discipline by allowing outsiders to better price banks’
risks and prevent bank insiders from engaging in the excessive risk-taking behavior (Tarullo [2010],
Bernanke [2013]). However, in promoting financial stability, capital requirements may exacerbate bank-
specific inefficiencies and encourage managers to act strategically, taking action to inflate short-term
performance (Goldstein and Sapra [2015]).
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted critical deficiencies in the risk management practices and re-
siliency of financial institutions. In the wake of the crisis, regulators devised a new type of bank exami-
nation, known as stress tests, which quickly rose to the top of the agenda of policymakers and regulators.
The purpose of these tests is to make sure that banks have enough capital to continue lending even in
adverse economic conditions. To determine the vulnerability of financial institutions, regulators intro-
duced such stress tests in the U.S. on October 15, 2008, and have conducted them regularly since then.
Unlike ordinary banking examinations, stress tests are forward-looking assessments of capital adequacy
under a variety of stressful scenarios. Moreover, these tests are unusually transparent, and banks must
disclose their results to the public. European banking authorities also conducted a series of stress-testing
exercises during the financial crisis.1
The key feature of stress tests is that the Federal Reserve relies extensively on self-reported informa-
tion from banks to run hypothetical scenarios. Bank managers have considerable discretion in the way
in which they record losses on their loans. These managers determine whether to classify a past due
loan as non-performing. They make real decisions regarding whether to restructure problematic loans
or remove them completely from their books. They also have discretion regarding the amount of money
they set aside as a cushion in case any of the loans has not paid back. A critical question then is whether
1In contrast to the U.S. bank stress tests, the 2009 European stress exercises did not require banks to publish bank-
specific results. In 2010 and 2011, however, stress test results for individual banks were published.
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stress tests adversely affect managerial decisions as managers try to meet their capital requirements.
The hypothesis this question suggests is that seeking capital adequacy induces managers to classify loan
losses so as appear healthier and increase their capital. Such managerial actions raise concerns over the
requirements of bank stress tests.
In this paper, I empirically examine the causal impact of capital adequacy requirements on managerial
actions. I test this hypothesis using the Federal Reserve’s criterion for determining which banks are to be
stress-tested. The criterion for being tested was to have at least $100 billion in assets in the last quarter
of 2008. Based on this criterion, not all banks were included in the stress tests. I, therefore, exploit the
cross-sectional variation in bank managerial actions before and after the time of the policy change using
a difference-in-differences approach. I choose banks with assets close to but below $100 billion in the last
quarter of 2008 as a control group. In later rounds, stress tests were conducted in mid-sized banks with
assets of between $10 and $50 billion as well as in larger banks with assets above $50 billion in the last
quarter of 2013. To make certain that banks in my sample are comparable, I matched banks subject to
the tests with non-tested banks before the tests, based on observable characteristics.
An important regulatory capital ratio is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital adjusted by risk-weighted
assets.2 The primary component of Tier 1 capital is shareholder equity, while Tier 2 capital primarily
consists of loan loss reserves and subordinated debt.3 I find that regulatory capital was exactly identical
in the stress-tested and non-tested groups prior to the stress tests, with differences between two groups
emerging just at the time the stress tests were announced and these differences have remained relatively
constant since then. I graphically show point estimates of total capital ratio with 95% confidence intervals
in the quarters before and after the announcement of the stress tests (see Figure 1). The difference is
3.5% on average, which is considerable in magnitude. Stress-tested banks evidently achieve a higher
capital ratio only after learning of the tests’ requirements. Managers of stress-tested banks were capable
of reaching such high capital ratios during the financial crisis. Normally one would think that these
higher capital ratios reflect financial health of these banks. But this makes it important to understand
what these banks do to meet the capital requirements and how managers pass the stress tests.
I find that managers in stress-tested banks find a way to meet their capital targets through decisions
they make regarding loan losses. Managers in stress-tested banks dramatically reduced net loan charge-
offs after the announcement. They chose to keep problematic loans on their books instead of removing
them. Through this action, managers run a risk that assets continue to deteriorate, and recoveries will
be further delayed into the future. As a result of that the percentage of non-performing loans increased
in stress-tested banks. Such restructuring helps them appear healthier so stress-tested banks increase
2The International Basel Committee requires a minimum limit of 4% for a Tier 1 capital ratio, and 8% for total capital
ratio
3Loan loss reserves account for at most 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. But in the first two quarters after the implemen-
tation of SFAS 166 and 167 in November 2009, a bank under certain conditions, was permitted to include without limit in
Tier 2 capital the full amount of the loan loss reserves.
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loan loss provisions and reduce net loan charge-offs to increase their capital ratio requirements.
Managers in the stress-tested group increase their total capital ratio by .66 of one standard deviation
from the mean. Stress tests also induce managers to reduce net loan charge-offs by .27 of one stan-
dard deviation and increase non-performing loans by .39 of one standard deviation. This action causes
large increases of .29 and .43 of one standard deviation in loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves,
respectively. Moreover, stress-tested banks with greater exposure to the housing market reduce net loan
charge-offs and increase restructuring to a greater extent than banks with less exposure. This is because
these banks were in worse financial health when the stress tests began; forcing managers to do more
to reach their capital targets. My results show that stress-tested banks manage loan losses and not
securities presumably because securities are priced by the market and are easily verifiable.
There are multiple channels of capital adjustment. Managers can increase retained earnings, a cor-
poration’s internally generated capital, by increasing profitability or reducing dividends. They can also
issue new equity, sell assets, or reduce their risk-weighted assets. I show that the primary way that
stress-tested banks increase their capital ratios is by the way they manage loan losses. My findings only
reveal that stress-testing induced banks to keep more problematic loans on their books causing them to
raise their loan loss reserves as a result. Of course, this risky course of action turned out well, ex post,
because the housing and other markets recovered, rather than faltered further. The key point is that
from a policy perspective, the merits of stress-testing that induce banks to retain more non-performing
loans need to be evaluated on an ex ante basis, rather than an ex post one.
To separate the effects of stress tests from the confounding effects of other policies that are triggered
by asset size, I consider the later rounds of stress tests that followed a change in the asset criterion. The
Dodd-Frank Act stress tests (DFAST) introduced in 2014 include mid-sized banks with assets of between
$10 and $50 billion as well as banks with at least $50 billion in assets. The change in the asset threshold
enables me to distinguish the possible confounding effects of bank size, as banks that were part of the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) tests in 2009 and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis
and Review (CCAR) tests in 2011 and 2012 tests had greater assets. I find behavior in mid-sized banks
that is similar to that of large ones, but the effects of this behavior are less severe, most likely reflecting
the improved overall financial health of banks, which has reduced the need to manage losses to the same
extent.
The focus of prior research on financial accounting in banks is mostly on the correlation between
accounting methods and behavior such as lending choices and investment. The literature examines
whether banks use financial reporting discretion to circumvent capital adequacy requirements or to
smooth earnings (Ahmed et al. [1999],Beatty et al. [2002]). Findings by King and Levine [1993],Jayaratne
and Strahan [1998] and Beck et al. [2000] imply that any factor, including bank opacity, that interferes
with the governance of banks can distort capital allocation and slow growth. Huizinga and Laeven [2012]
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show that banks overstated the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the U.S.
mortgage crisis, and Jiang et al. [2014] show that deregulation that enhances competition in the banking
industry improves disclosure quality. Mariathasan and Merrouche [2014] and Begley et al. [2015] show
that banks significantly under-report the risks in their trading books when they have less equity capital.
This paper is the first study to show the causal impact of capital adequacy requirements on managerial
actions using bank stress tests as a policy change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background of stress tests. Section
3 describes data, construction of the main outcome variables. Section 4 provides the empirical strategy
and matching method. Section 5 shows summary statistics and pre-regulation distribution tests. Section
6 illustrates the validity of the approach. Section 7 presents the main results. Section 8 provides an
overall picture of paper and policy implications.
II Institutional Background
Many observers link the 2008 financial crisis to bank opacity. According to Gorton (2008) “the ongoing
panic is due to a loss of information.” The reason is bank counterparties and investors cannot evaluate
bank solvency as well as bank insiders. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted concerns about asymmetric
information and illiquidity in the U.S. banking system, which induced panic in the financial system. The
government responded to the crisis with unprecedented actions, including bank stress tests, liquidity
provision, debt and deposit guarantees, large-scale asset purchases and direct assistance. Bank stress tests
began annually in 2009 with the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) tests and followed
by the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) tests in 2011 and 2012 and Dodd-Frank
Act (DFAST) tests in 2013 and 2014. There was no stress test in 2010.
Stress tests were an unprecedented event in scope, as well as the range of information that is made
public about the forecasted losses and capital positions of the tested banks. The first rounds of tests
require the largest U.S. bank holding companies to undergo simultaneous, forward-looking examinations
to determine if they would have adequate capital to continue lending in adverse economic conditions. In
the first year of implementation, the criterion for bank holding companies to be included in stress tests
was to have at least $100 billion in assets in the last quarter of 2008. Nineteen bank holding companies
were selected based on this criterion and included in yearly stress tests since 2009. Although the number
of banks subject to stress tests is not large, these bank holding companies represent about two-thirds
of the U.S. banking assets and more than half of loans in the U.S. Each year, stress tests examine the
likelihood that these nineteen U.S. bank holding companies would remain solvent under serious economic
distress. The Federal Reserve reported results of bank stress tests since May 7, 2009.
Stress tests differ from ordinary bank examinations in three key dimensions (Hirtle et al. [2009]).
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First, stress-tested banks are subject to simultaneous examinations with the same underlying assumptions
about economic conditions and loan losses and the same quantitative techniques. In contrast, ordinary
examinations are bank by bank with little simultaneous comparison across banks. Second, stress tests
are forward-looking to assess banks’ future capital needs and examine forecasted loan losses years into
the future. In contrast, ordinary examinations focus on banks’ current conditions. While researchers
have found that results of ordinary examinations have little or no predictive power for bank performance
after accounting for market indicators (Berger et al. [2000]), the forward-looking nature of stress tests
held the promise that stress tests’ results might inform the market. Third, stress tests are unusually
transparent. Outputs such as losses and capital buffers as well as inputs, the modeling assumptions and
the processes involved in producing the outputs are disclosed. In contrast, ordinary examinations are
opaque, including confidential inputs and outputs.
The goal of stress tests is to return confidence to market investors. Regulators identify disclosure
of results as a key component of stress tests’ success. For instance, on May 6, 2010, Ben S. Bernanke
states4 that “we now can see that stress assessment, in fact, met its objectives of reducing uncertainty
about losses and ensuring sufficient capital in the largest banking firms, and that the public disclosure
was an important reason for its success. The release of detailed information enhanced the credibility of
the exercise by giving outside analysts the ability to assess the findings, which helped restore investor
confidence in the banking system.” The Federal Reserve believes that disclosure of stress test results
provides valuable information to market participants and enhances transparency. However, the tests are
not transparent enough. If the tests were transparent, managers could not improve their financial health
and meet the capital ratio requirements through managing losses. I show that the design of stress tests
does not take misaligned incentives of managers into account.
I employ the Federal Reserve’s criterion in selecting banks to be included in stress tests as an exoge-
nous source of variation to estimate models. All domestic bank holding companies with assets exceeding
$100 billion in the last quarter of 2008 are required to participate in stress tests and are considered as
a treated group. In the last quarter of each year, asset values of banks are examined relative to $100
billion to determine whether they need to be included in the next year’s stress tests. To define the
treated group, I use asset values as an exogenous source of variation in the last quarter of 2008. The
reason is in the first year of stress tests, banks were unaware of the Federal Reserve’s criterion and cannot
manipulate assets to avoid the tests. Following 2009, all nineteen banks subject to the first year’s stress
test participate in the later rounds of stress tests.
To separate the effects of stress tests from possible confounding effects of other policies that are
triggered by asset size, I exploit a second natural experiment in the size of the asset threshold. This
experiment is Dodd-Frank Act stress test of 2014 (DFAST 2014), which began on October 1, 2013. The
4Speech at the 46th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition
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Federal Reserve has conducted supervisory stress tests on all BHCs with $50 billion or more in total
consolidated assets as of December 31, 2013, a total of 30 BHCs, using scenarios that the Federal Reserve
designed. These BHCs were also required to conduct company-run stress tests under the supervisory
scenarios. Mid-sized banks with assets of between $10 and $50 billion are also required to conduct an
annual company-run stress test. As a result, an additional 45 BHCs conduct the Dodd-Frank Act stress
tests under this rule.
Under DFAST, mid-sized banks are required to assess their capital, using a minimum of three macroe-
conomic scenarios provided by the Federal Reserve. The scenarios are baseline, adverse and severely
adverse scenarios. Each scenario includes economic variables, including unemployment, exchange rates,
prices, incomes and interest rates. The adverse and severely adverse scenarios are not forecasted, but
rather hypothetical scenarios designed to assess the strength of financial institutions. The scenarios are
the same for both the over $50 billion and $10 billion to $50 billion size institutions.
III Data, Key Outcome Variables and Model Specifications
This section presents data sources and describes the construction of key variables. I use net loan charge-
offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves as key outcome variables.
A Data
The main data source is from the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FRB
Y-9C) quarterly filings with the Federal Reserve System. The data includes all publicly traded bank
holding companies headquartered in the U.S. and operating from January 2005 to March 2015. To obtain
missing accounting information of banks, I use the Compustat quarterly database. To link FRB data
with the Compustat, I first use a matching dataset to link FRB data with CRSP 5. Then, I obtain
accounting information by linking CRSP dataset to Compustat.
B Key Outcome Variables
Banks bear a risk of the possibility that the borrower will fail to repay as promised. The two major assets
in which banks invest funds are securities and loans. Losses on loans are substantial. Bank managers
have considerable discretion in the way in which they record loan losses. Loan loss reserves (LLR) absorb
loan losses both from loans the bank can currently identify as bad loans and from apparently good loans
that will later prove to be uncollectible. The reserve for loan loss account is maintained by charges
against earnings. The charges show up as an expense category named loan loss provisions (LLP) on the
income statement.
5A data set matching Call Report and CRSP identifiers is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_
research/datasets.html
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Bank managers determine whether to classify a past due loan as non-performing (NPL), a loan carried
on the bank’s balance sheet that no longer accrues interest. They make real decisions regarding whether
to restructure problematic loans or remove them completely from their financial statements. They also
have discretion regarding the amount of money they set aside as a cushion in case any of the loans has not
paid back. When a bank decides that some portion of a loan will not be collected so must be charged-off,
the amount of loss is deducted from the asset category loans and also from loan losses reserves. Net
loan charge-offs (NCO), which subtracts loan recoveries from written-off loans, would reduce loan loss
reserves. Bank managers can increase loan loss reserves by increasing loan loss provisions or reducing
net loan charge-offs (equation 1.1).
LLRit = LLRit−1 + LLPit −NCOit (1.1)
The way that the Federal Reserve relies extensively on self-reported information from banks to run
hypothetical scenarios of stress tests is problematic. The main requirement of stress tests is to meet an
important regulatory capital ratio, which is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital adjusted by risk-weighted
assets. The Tier 1 capital consists of shareholder equity, perpetual preferred stock and minority interest
in consolidated subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital include limited-life preferred stock, subordinated debt, loan
loss reserves up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. The primary component of Tier 1 capital is shareholder
equity, while Tier 2 capital primarily consists of loan loss reserves and subordinated debt, with the
restriction that loan loss reserves are limited to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets.
Bank managers increase loan loss reserves through increasing loan loss provisions and decreasing net
loan charge-offs. An increase in loan loss reserves can increase regulatory capital. Loan loss provisions
increase the total capital ratio by the tax rate times the provision amount. Net loan charge-offs have a
slightly different effect relative to loan loss provisions. Since charge-offs do not affect the shareholders
equity, the sole effect of a reduction in charge-offs would be to increase Tier 2 capital, and therefore total
regulatory capital. Therefore, managers meet the capital ratio requirements through increasing loan loss
provisions and reducing net loan charge-offs. Bank managers make real decisions regarding restructuring
problematic loans or removing them completely from their books. Hence, managers find a way to meet
the capital adequacy requirements through managing loan losses. The main outcome variables in my
empirical analysis are net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves
and total capital ratio in banks.
Financial accounting information plays a fundamental corporate governance role, supporting monitor-
ing by boards of directors, outside investors and regulators (Bushman and Smith [2001]). Informational
transparency of banks promotes market discipline in which market participants monitor excessive risk-
taking by banks’ managers. Therefore, a key building block of market discipline is the availability of
7
consistent and reliable information on banks’ financial performance and risk exposures provided by fi-
nancial accounting (Stephanou [2010]). Loan loss provisions are the largest accrual for most banks. Bank
managers use loan loss provisions to reflect expected future losses on their loan portfolios. Despite exten-
sive regulatory oversight, bank managers have considerable discretion in how they recognize and record
the provision for loan losses. Loan loss provisions are extensively used by bank managers to manipulate
reported earnings (Collins et al. [1995], Liu and Ryan [1995], Kim and Kross [1998], Beatty et al. [2002],
Kanagaretnam et al. [2003], Kanagaretnam et al. [2004] and Fonseca and Gonzalez [2008]).
By using a loan loss provision, a bank makes sure that it has enough capital to survive defaulted loans.
The size of the provision should reflect the riskiness of loans that bank has offered and the overall strength
of the economy. However, managerial discretion is a double-edged sword (Dechow and Skinner [2000]).
While increased discretion may facilitate incorporation of more information about future expected losses
into loan provisioning decisions, it also increases potential for misguided behavior by managers that can
degrade bank transparency and lead to negative consequences (Walland and Koch [2000]).
IV Empirical Strategy and Matching Method
This section describes the empirical strategy to test the hypotheses of the paper. I employ a difference-in-
differences approach6 to examine the impact of capital adequacy on managerial decisions. I also describe
the matching method used in the second experiment to choose banks with characteristics similar to those
subject to stress tests.
A Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy has two different components: First, stress tests were an unprecedented event in
response to the recent financial crisis and were not driven by an individual bank’s performance. Second,
the criterion for inclusion in the stress tests was not determined by bank holding companies (BHCs),
but rather was exogenously defined by the Federal Reserve. Thus, considering an exogenous source of
variation in the asset size, I classify banks into two separate groups. Banks subject to stress tests as the
treated group and banks with asset sizes close to the treated one as the control group.
I determine the best comparable group to the banks subject to stress tests based on a ranking of
asset values. I sort on asset values in the last quarter of 2008 to determine the control group and select
the next nineteen large banks with asset values below the $100 billion threshold. Banks close to the $100
billion threshold have similar observable characteristics except their assets’ value. I examine the impact
of capital adequacy requirements on managerial actions using a difference-in-differences approach. I use
6I tried using the regression discontinuity method, but having too few bank observations around the threshold prevents
me from proceeding with this identification strategy.
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loan losses as outcome variables to estimate the model.
Yit = αi + δt + β1Treatedi ∗ Postt + εit (1.2)
Using quarterly data of BHCs, I estimate equation (1.2), where Treatedi is a bank subject to the stress
tests, Postt is an indicator variable with a value of one for quarters beginning with 2008Q4, the time
of the first stress tests announcement. δt is the year fixed effect. Yit represents outcome variables such
as net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves, discretionary loan
loss provisions and discretionary realizations of gains and losses on securities. I include bank and year
fixed effects. Standard errors have clustered at the bank level.
Equation (1.2) is the main specification of the model. The coefficient of interest is β1 which is the
interaction term between the banks subject to the stress tests and post year 2008Q4 that refers to the
announcement time of stress tests. This coefficient shows the impact of capital adequacy requirements
on managerial decisions. The hypothesis is managers in stress-tested banks reduce net loan charge-
offs, increase non-performing loans, loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves to meet the capital ratio
requirements. In particular, setting specific targets for banks induce managers to inflate their short-term
performance to pass the tests. Also, banks have higher discretion over loan loss provisions in response
to stress tests announcement.
The hypothesis is stress-tested bank reduce net loan charge-offs and increase non-performing loans,
loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves to meet the capital ratio requirements. Therefore, I expect to
observe a significant negative sign of β1 for net loan charge-offs and a significant positive sign of β1 for
non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves and total capital ratios. Bank managers in
the stress-tested group can increase Tier 2 capital by decreasing net loan charge-offs and increasing loan
loss provisions.
The second hypothesis is that banks with large shares of real-estate loans have greater incentives to
manage losses to meet the capital ratio targets. The reason is that real-estate loans have been particularly
affected by recent house price decline and managers in these banks were in poor financial health when
the stress tests began.
Yit = αi + δt + β2Treatedi ∗ Postt + β3RealEstateShareit−1 ∗ Treatedi (1.3)
+β4RealEstateShareit−1 ∗ Treatedi ∗ Postt + εit
Using quarterly data of BHCs, I estimate equation (1.3), where Treatedi is a bank subject to the
stress tests, Postt is an indicator variable with value of one for the periods of 2008Q4 and after and
RealEstateShareit denotes the exposure to housing market that is real-estate loans divided by total
loans. δt is the year fixed effect. Yit represents outcome variables such as net loan charge-offs, non-
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performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves, realizations of gains and losses on securities and
discretionary loan loss provisions. I include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors have clustered
at the bank level.
Equation (1.3) tests the second hypothesis. I include the real-estate variable to test whether banks
subject to stress test with greater exposure to the housing market behave differently from the treated
banks with less exposure to house price declines. The net impact of housing market exposure is β3 plus
β4, which includes banks subject to the stress test, the share of real-estate and post year 2008Q4 that
refers to the announcement of stress tests. The hypothesis predicts that the net effect should be negative
for net loan charge-offs and positive for non-performing loans, loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves.
The reason is banks with a higher volume of real-estate loans in their portfolios have more incentives to
manage losses post the tests announcement. Thus, greater exposure to housing market induce managers
of the treated banks to reduce net loan charge-offs, and increase non-performing loans, loan loss provisions
and loan loss reserves to a greater extent. To mitigate concerns over asset size, I focus on the Dodd-Frank
Act tests implemented in 2014. In the later rounds of stress tests, mid-sized banks were also included as
part of the tests. Therefore, to be certain that the results are not driven by asset size, I also focus on
mid-sized banks. I define treated banks as those with assets of between $10 and $50 billion, which are
required to perform company-run stress tests. Postt is an indicator variable with a value of one for the
periods of 2014Q1 and after to reflect the quarters after the announcement of Dodd-Frank Act tests in
2014Q1. Overall, I re-estimate equation (1.2) using a newly treated group of mid-sized banks.
B Matching Method
Using 2014 Dodd-Frank Act tests as a policy change, I choose comparable banks with close characteristics
to those subject to stress tests through a propensity matching method. To construct the control group,
I match banks subject to DFAST 2014 in the last quarter of 2013 with a comparable bank regarding ob-
servables. The banks in the control group are all publicly traded bank holding companies headquartered
in theU.S. and have assets below $10 billion. For each matched pair of banks in the sample, I compute
the following propensity score based on equation (1.4).
5∑
i=1
(
xTi − xCi
(xTi + x
C
i )/2
)2 (1.4)
Where, xi is one of the five characteristics including total assets, change in total loans divided by lagged
total loans, change in non-performing loans divided by lagged total loans, total risk-adjusted capital ratio
and return on assets. Also, the superscripts T and C refer to treated and control banks, respectively. For
each bank in the treated group, I choose a bank with the smallest score and eliminate the matched bank
from the sample following a no replacement process. Overall, the matching process creates the closest
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match to each treated bank subject to DFAST 2014.
C Model Specifications
Following the accounting literature on banking, I model banks account for provisions based on certain
observable bank characteristics that have plausible explanatory power for loan loss provisions; any un-
explained loan loss provision captures bank management discretion. I focus on the deviation of loan
loss provisions from their expected value driven by observables. To measure bank financial reporting
discretion, I follow Beatty and Liao [2014] and specify a model of loan loss provisions using observable
characteristics of banks as explanatory variables. To assess the associations of the model with reporting
discretion, I use residuals of an estimation as proxies for discretionary loan loss provisions.
I specify the following model as in equation 1.5, where LLPit is loan loss provisions scaled by lagged
of total loans, LnAssetit is the natural log of total assets, ∆NPLit is change in non-performing loans
divided by lagged of total loans, ∆Loanit is change in total loans divided by lagged total loans.
LLPit = αi + β1LnAssetit−1 + β2∆NPLit−2 + β3∆NPLit−1 + β4∆NPLit (1.5)
+β5∆NPLit+1 + β6∆Loanit + εit
The model includes all variables from Bushman and Williams [2012] and Liu and Ryan [1995]. I
include ∆NPLit+1 and ∆NPLit in the model to reflect the possibility that some banks may use
forward-looking information on non-performing loans that are less discretionary and more timely in
estimating loan loss provisions. ∆NPLit−1 and ∆NPLit−2 are included to represent the fact that some
banks use past non-performing loan information to estimate loan loss provisions. I control for bank size
(LnAssetit−1), because banks of different sizes may be subject to different levels of regulatory scrutiny
or monitoring. Finally, I control for loan growth (∆Loanit) because loan loss provisions may be higher
when the bank lends to low-quality customers.
The fitted value of the above equation represents normal loan losses based on the observables, and the
residuals of the regression are taken as the abnormal or discretionary component of loan loss provisions.
Both the size and sign of discretionary loan loss provisions are subject to manager’s judgment. Managerial
discretion in the use of accruals can make it harder for outsiders to evaluate the true performance of
banks. The discretionary loan loss provisions reflect the quality of disclosure in banks. In other words,
higher discretionary loan loss provisions show the low quality of financial reporting by banks.
To find discretionary realizations of gains and losses on securities, I again follow Beatty et al. [2002].
I estimate the following regression using realized gains and losses on securities (Gainsit) as a fraction
of total assets as an outcome variable. I estimate equation 1.6 using the natural log of total assets and
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unrealized security gains and losses (Ugainsit) as explanatory variables.
Gainsit = αi + β1LnAssetit + β2Ugainsit + εit (1.6)
The residuals from this estimation are considered as the discretionary component of realized security
gains and losses. Note that higher levels of realized securities gains and losses increase earnings.
V Variables and Pre-Regulation Distribution Tests
This section first provides summary statistics of main banking variables consists of general balance sheet
information, loan portfolio, loan losses, risk and profitability measures. I report the summary statistics of
two different types of banks, including large and mid-sized companies. Then, I show relevant distribution
tests in the absence of regulation to assess the comparison between banks subject to stress tests and the
control group regarding observable characteristics.
A Variables
The general variables included in the analysis are total assets, deposits, and liquid assets. The category
of loan portfolio includes total loans and its components, such as loans secured by real estate, commercial
and industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, agricultural loans, consumer loans and total foreign
loans. The category of loan loss and delinquency measures consist of loan loss provisions, loan loss
allowance, non-performing loans, net loan charge-off, realized and unrealized gains. The risk measures
are the capital-asset ratio, total risk-adjusted capital ratio, Tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio and Tier 1
leverage ratio. Finally, the profitability measures include return on equity, return on assets and interest
margin. Table 1.1 provides definitions of variables used in the model based on the Federal Reserve’s
codes. I list the name of banks subject to stress tests and banks in a control group in Table1.2 and 1.3.
B Pre-Regulation Distribution Tests
To assess the differences between banks subject to stress tests and the control group, I perform a pre-
regulation mean test for the sample of large and mid-sized banks. I remove four of the largest banks
in the treated group and four of the smallest banks in the control group. I observe large banks subject
to stress tests are different from the ones not part of the stress tests prior to the tests announcement
regarding asset size and loan loss provisions (Table 1.4). But, stress-tested banks are the same as the
non-tested group prior to the tests announcement regarding net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans
and loan loss reserves.
I assess the differences between mid-sized banks subject to stress tests and the non-tested group
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prior to the DFAST in 2014. Stress-tested banks and non-tested group are different regarding asset size
and loan loss reserves. The average value of assets is $5 billion in the control group, while $20 billion
in the treated group. But stress-tested banks are the same as the non-tested group regarding net loan
charge-offs, non-performing loans and loan loss provisions prior to the stress tests announcement (Table
1.5).
I show the results of mean and change in mean tests prior to stress tests announcement between the
first quarter of 2005 and the third quarter of 2008. The level of variables are different between treated
and control groups but on average their changes are the same 1.6-Panel A). I illustrate average of assets,
net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves, total capital ratio,
total deposits, total loans, and return on equity between stress-tested and non-tested groups prior to the
stress test announcement. Banks subject to stress tests are similar to the control group regarding the
changes in these characteristics before the tests announcement.
Using mid-sized banks as treated group, I evaluate the quality of matching through performing the
mean test and change in the mean between the first quarter and the third quarter of 2013, in the absence
of stress tests. Here, I consider treated banks with assets between $10 and $50 billion in the last quarter
of 2013 as the treated group. Treated and control banks are different regarding various observable
characteristics such as assets, loan loss reserves, deposits and loans but they are the same in a change of
these variables (Table 1.6-Panel B).
VI Validity of the Approach
In this section, I assess the validity of the empirical strategy with regards to changes in net loan charge-
offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves prior to the stress tests announce-
ment. Moreover, I present the main results regardings the impact of capital adequacy on managerial
decisions in both large and mid-sized banks. Drawing valid inferences from these estimations require
that the change in outcome variables in banks subject to stress tests and control group would have been
the same in the absence of stress tests.
For instance, if the trend in non-performing loans differs between banks subject to stress tests and
the control group, then the empirical results would be biased. To justify that empirical results of the
paper are not simply driven by a trend, I test the parallel trend assumption for each outcome variables.
The results of an event study illustrate that stress-tested banks are not different from the non-tested
group regarding net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves,
prior to the tests announcement. The differences between the treated and control groups emerge just
at the time the stress tests were announced. Furthermore, examining other observables in banks, again
show same results. Stress-tested banks are the same as the non-tested group regarding loans, deposits
13
and discretionary loan loss provisions prior to the tests announcement.
It is essential to confirm that the treated banks, which are subject to stress tests, are not systematically
different from the control group prior to the stress tests announcement. I specify the evolution of loan
loss variables in quarters before and after the introduction of the tests. I begin by setting time zero to
be the last quarter of 2008 when stress tests announced and then one-quarter before stress tests is shown
by -1 and one-quarter after the tests is shown by +1.
Yit = αi + β1Q
−16
t ∗ Treatedi + β2Q−15t ∗ Treatedi + ...+ β30Q+14t ∗ Treatedi+ (1.7)
β31Q
+15
t ∗ Treatedi + εit
The mode is estimated using quarters before and after stress tests announcement, where the quarter
dummy variable Q−nt equals one for banks in the nth quarter before the stress tests announcement, and
the quarter dummy variable Q+nt equals one for banks in the nth quarter after stress tests initiation. I
use bank fixed effect in my estimations. I consider a 30-quarter window, spanning from fifteen quarters
before and after the tests announcement. I then plot the estimated coefficients on the interaction term
in 95% confidence interval.
Total capital ratio was exactly identical in the stress-tested and non-tested groups prior to the stress
tests, with differences between two groups emerging just at the time the stress tests were announced.
These differences have remained relatively constant since then. I graphically show point estimates of
total capital ratio with 95% confidence intervals in the quarters before and after the announcement of
the stress tests (Figure 1.1-Panel a). A large proportion of total capital ratio can be explained by loan
loss reserves (Figure 1.1-Panel b), showing that managers use this channel to make capital adjustments.
The graphical results of point estimates illustrate that the change in net loan charge-offs, non-
performing loans, loan loss provision and loan loss reserves are the same between the treated and control
groups prior to the stress tests announcement. More importantly, the impact of capital adequacy re-
quirements on loan loss variables emerges just in the aftermath of stress tests announcement in the last
quarter of 2008 (Figure 1.2). The announcement time of stress test is shown by a blue vertical line.
Stress-tested banks significantly reduce net loan charge-offs and begin to keep troubled loans on their
books after the announcement of the tests. Through this action, managers run a risk that assets continue
to deteriorate, and recoveries will be further delayed into the future. Stress-tested banks reduce net loan
charge-offs for seven quarters and then levels of net loan charge-offs start to increase but still less than
the control group (Figure 1.2-Panel a).
Consequently, stress-tested banks have a higher level of non-performing loans starting in the last
quarter of 2008 and add up their troubled loans during that time. Banks in the stress-tested group
have a higher level of non-performing loans for six quarters, and then the level decreases but still much
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higher than banks in the control group (Figure 1.2-Panel b). Regarding loan loss provisions, managers
in the stress-tested group over report loan loss provisions just at the time of the tests announcement.
Then they unwind their action for one quarter and again they increase loan loss provisions for three
quarters (Figure 1.2-Panel c). Stress-tested banks increase loan loss reserves at the time of the tests
announcement as a result of a reduction in net loan charge-offs and an increase in loan loss provisions
(Figure 1.2-Panel d). Similar to non-performing loans, managers in stress-tested banks increase loan loss
reserves for six quarters and then the level of reserves decreases but still higher than the control group.
Moreover, results of the event-study show that stress-tested banks are similar to the non-tested
group regarding securities, discretionary loan loss provisions, total loans, and deposits prior to the tests
announcement. The significant differences between the treated and control group emerge regarding
discretionary loan loss provisions when the tests were announced. Regarding realizations of gains and
losses on securities, there are no differences between the treated and control group prior or after the
stress tests announcement. Managers do not use this channel to manage losses, since securities are tied
to the market price and are easier to verify. Stress-tested banks cut back lending and have an increase
in deposits after the tests announcement.
Examining mid-sized banks, I test the validity of the approach to confirm that empirical results are
not simply driven by a trend. I estimate equation 1.7 using mid-sized banks as the treated group in
DFAST 2014. I set year zero to be the first quarter of 2014 when DFAST was announced. Then, one-
quarter before stress tests is shown by -1 and one-quarter after the tests is shown by +1. Results show
that treated banks are the same as a control group regarding changes in loan loss variables in the absence
of stress tests.
The graphical results illustrate the change in net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss
provisions, loan loss reserves and discretionary loan loss provisions, are similar prior to the stress tests
announcement. However, it is not the case that the differences between treated and control groups
emerge after DFAST in 2014. The reason might be associated to a small number of quarters passed
after DFAST or the fact that banks have higher profitability in 2014 comparing to the time of the crisis.
Therefore, mid-sized banks manage loan losses in general but not evident specifically in each quarter
after the test.
VII Main Results
This section provides the empirical results in testing the impact of capital adequacy on managerial
decisions. The results provide strong evidence supporting the hypotheses that banks manage loan losses
through reducing net loan charge-offs, keeping problematic loans on their books and having more non-
performing loans. Moreover, banks subject to stress tests with greater exposure to the housing market
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manage losses more than banks with a lower share of real-estate loans in their portfolios. Banks subject
to stress tests exert higher discretion over loan loss provisions. Using DFAST 2014 as a policy change
on mid-sized banks supports the main results and reveals that bank size does not drive the results.
A Results of Stress Tests on Large Banks (SCAP 2009, CCAR 2011 and
CCAR 2012)
Managerial Decisions in Large Banks
Table 1.7 presents results of using loan loss variables as an outcome of (1.2). Estimates imply that
banks subject to stress tests keep troubled loans in their portfolio more than banks not subject to the
tests. The net loan charge-offs are lower for banks subjected to the tests relative to the control group
(Table 1.7-Column (1)). Also, the magnitude of the effect is large, the average of net loan charge-off is
-.26 while the coefficient is -.097. Writing fewer loans off their balance sheet, stress-tested banks have a
higher level of non-performing loans (Table 1.7-Column (2)). The magnitude of the effect is .77, which is
large comparing to the average of non-performing loans, which is 2.24. Stress-tested banks have higher
loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves as well (Table 1.7-Column (3) and (4)). The coefficients are
significant and positive in line with the hypotheses of the paper.
As expected, I did not find any impact of capital adequacy on securities. The reason is securities are
priced by the market and easily verifiable. Stress-tested banks cut back lending and the level of deposits
increased after the stress tests announcement. Regarding discretionary loan loss provisions, estimates of
equation (1.2) show that banks subject to the tests have higher discretionary loan loss provisions after
the announcement of the tests in the last quarter of 2008. The magnitude of effect on discretionary loan
loss provisions is .26 of one standard deviation (Table 1.8-Column (1) and (4)).
Managers in the stress-tested group increase their total capital ratio by .66 of one standard deviation
from the mean. Stress tests also induce managers to reduce net loan charge-offs by .27 of one standard
deviation and increase non-performing loans by .39 of one standard deviation. This action causes in-
creases of .29 and .43 of one standard deviation in loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves, respectively.
Moreover, stress-tested banks with greater exposure to the housing market reduce net loan charge-offs
and increase restructuring to a greater extent than banks with less exposure. This is because these
banks were in poor financial health when the stress tests began; this gave managers greater incentives to
manage losses. My results show that stress-tested banks manage loan losses and not securities because
securities are priced by the market and are easily verifiable.
I investigate the consequences of stress tests and how actually managers were able to meet the capital
ratio requirements. I estimate equation (1.2) using loan losses measures as outcome variables. Banks
subject to stress tests have lower net charge-offs and higher non-performing loans, loan loss provisions
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and loan loss reserves in response to the capital requirements. Overall, the larger magnitude of the effect
is related to loan loss reserves and then non-performing loans with a magnitude of .43 and .39 of one
standard deviation, respectively. Therefore, there are significant differences between banks subject to
stress tests and the control group regarding loan loss variables. Note that here I consider years from 2005
to 2011 and not 2012. The reason is banks were less healthy between 2009 to 2011 and much healthier in
2012. Incentives to meet the targets are stronger when banks are more in trouble. However, the results
are robust including 2012 into the sample but slightly smaller in magnitude.
The Exposure to the Housing Market in Large Banks
Further, I investigate how stress-tested banks’ exposure to real-estate affect managerial decisions. The
hypothesis is banks with a greater share of real-estate loans in their portfolio are less healthy than the
other banks with less exposure to the housing market. Therefore, one expects to see more managing of
loan losses from troubled banks. Table 1.9 presents results of using loan loss variables as an outcome of
equation (1.3). Using net loan charge-offs as outcome variables, the results is statistically and econom-
ically significant. Stress-tested banks with greater exposure to the housing market prior to stress tests
reduce net loan charge-offs .08 of one standard deviation than the control group (Table 1.9-Column (1)).
This shows that less healthy banks manage net loan charge-offs and non-performing loans to inflate the
capital ratio. The results of loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves are insignificant. Estimates imply
that stress-tested banks with a higher share of real-estate loans have a lower net loan charge-offs and
higher non-performing loans in the aftermath of the tests announcement. But stress-tested banks with
greater exposure to the housing market have lower total capital ratio after the stress tests announcement.
This shows troubled banks try to meet the capital requirements but still could not achieve it.
B Results of Stress Tests on Mid-Sized Banks (DFAST 2014)
Next, I investigate the impact of capital adequacy on managerial decisions using DFAST 2014 as a policy
change on mid-sized banks. The reason for examining mid-sized banks is to show that asset size does not
drive results of estimations. In the later rounds of stress tests, banks with a smaller value of assets are
subject to the tests. Estimates imply that capital adequacy requirements of stress test induce managers
to manage loan losses to meet the capital ratio requirements.
Managerial Decisions in Mid-Sized Banks
Using banks of assets between $10 and $50 billion in the last quarter of 2013 as treated group in
DFAST 2014, I examine the impact of capital adequacy on measures of loan loss and securities. Table
1.10 presents results of using loan loss variables as an outcome of equation (1.2). Estimates indicate
that banks subject to stress tests have higher levels of non-performing loans and loan loss reserves and
17
consequently discretionary loan loss provisions after the test announcement in 2014Q1. Stress-tested
banks increase non-performing loans by .13 of one standard deviation (Table 1.10-Column(2)). The
magnitude of effect in mid-sized banks is smaller than the impact of stress tests in large banks, which
was .39 of one standard deviation.
Moreover, stress-tested banks in DFAST 2014 increase loan loss reserves by .17 of one standard
deviation relative to the control group. The result on net loan charge-offs is insignificant for mid-sized
banks. The reason is related to the quality of data on loan charge-off, which has many missing values
after 2013. Further, I investigate the impact of stress tests on the total capital ratio in mid-sized banks.
The result is positive but insignificant. The reason can be attributed to the implementation time of
stress tests on mid-sized banks, which is 2014. In this year, banks are much healthy than banks in 2009
and, as a result, perform less managing of loan losses.
Therefore, in the first round of stress tests during the time of crisis, banks have greater incentives
to manage losses and meet the Federal stress tests’ requirements. Also, stress-tested banks also increase
discretionary loan loss provisions and securities. In general, mid-sized banks in the later rounds of stress
tests still manage losses to meet the capital ratio requirements.
VIII Conclusion
To summarize, policymakers enacted a large set of financial reforms in the U.S. banking system in
response to the recent financial crisis. In this paper, I focus on stress tests, a new set of banking
examinations used to determine whether banks have adequate capital to sustain lending to the economy
even in the most severe future recessions. Stress tests differ from regular banking examinations in
several dimensions. First, stress tests are simultaneous, forward-looking tests to assess banks’ future
capital needs and to forecast loan losses. Second, stress tests are unusually transparent in all inputs,
process and outputs of models and results of stress tests are disclosed to the public. Bank managers have
incentives to meet the Federal Reserve’s requirements at the expense of losing long-term performance.
In particular, bank managers manage loan losses by keeping more problematic loans on their balance
sheet and delaying the reporting of loan losses.
This paper examines the impact of capital adequacy on managerial decisions. The hypothesis is
banks subject to stress tests meet the capital ratio requirements through managing loan losses. The
recent stress test in the banking system is a compelling policy change to test this hypothesis. The reason
is stress tests are an unprecedented event in scale and scope, as well as the range of information that
made public on the projected losses and capital positions of the tested banks. Moreover, the Federal
Reserve’s criterion to include a bank as part of the stress tests was initially unknown and not driven by
an individual bank’s performance. Banks subject to stress tests reduce net loan charge-offs, have higher
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non-performing loans and loan loss reserves relative to banks with similar characteristics but not part
of the tests. Managers perform real manipulation and not accounting manipulation to meet the tests
requirements. Moreover, stress-tested banks have managed losses of loans but not securities. The reason
is securities are tied to the market price and are easier to verify.
I employ the Federal Reserve’s criterion as an exogenous source of variation in banks to investigate
the impact of capital adequacy on managerial decisions. Using a difference-in-difference approach and
matching method, this paper demonstrates that banks subject to stress tests manage loan losses. The
troubled banks with greater exposure to the housing market have more incentives to manage losses
and meet the capital ratio requirements. This paper documents that to meet the capital ratio targets,
managers reduce net loan charge-offs and increase loan loss provisions, non-performing loans and loan
loss reserves. This helps banks to look better and enhances their performance in the short-term at the
cost of losing credibility of information. The results are robust using mid-sized banks being tested in
the latest rounds of stress tests in 2014, known as Dodd-Frank Act stress tests. Stress-tested banks have
a higher level of non-performing loans and loan loss reserves, although the magnitude of the effects is
smaller comparing to the earlier rounds of stress tests. This may be due to the better financial health of
banks in the later years relative to the time of the financial crisis.
In general, this paper provides evidence on consequences of stress tests in the banking system. From
a policy perspective, the merits of stress-testing that induce banks to retain more non-performing loans
need to be evaluated. Policymakers should be mindful of the limitations of market discipline and consider
the costs of regulation as well as its benefits. In an economy with multiple imperfections, removing just
one does not necessarily improve total welfare. The implications of this paper are particularly relevant
for the debate on whether loan loss reserves should be considered as part of Tier 2 capital. Also, equity
issuance should become mandatory as part of the requirements of capital adequacy in the stress tests.
In promoting financial stability, regulators should consider the misaligned managerial incentives caused
by capital adequacy policies.
As my future research agenda, I explore whether stress testing affects mortgage foreclosures and if so,
how does it vary across states with different exposure to the housing market collapse? According to data,
some states such as California with higher foreclosure rates during the time of crisis recovers faster than
other states such as Illinois with a moderate foreclosure rate after the crisis but still struggles through
recoveries. I investigate whether non-performing overhang created by stress tests affects the recovery
of foreclosures after the financial crisis. Furthermore, in a separate project, I examine whether stress
tests introduce any systematic differences between stress-tested banks and non-tested group regarding
the accuracy of analysts forecast. In other words, is the market fooled by the action of managers in
stress-tested banks? These are important questions to answer in my future papers.
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Figure 1.1: This figure shows point estimate of differences between stress-tested banks and non-tested group using total capital ratio and
loan loss reserves as outcome variables. The y-axis represents outcome variables. The x-axis is the interaction term between each quarter and
treated banks. Point estimates are reported within 95% confidence intervals. The announcement time of stress tests is in the last quarter of
2008, shown by a blue vertical line.
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Figure 1.2: This figure shows point estimate of differences between stress-tested banks and non-tested group using net loan charge-offs, non-
performing loans, loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves as outcome variables. The y-axis represents outcome variables. The x-axis is the
interaction term between each quarter and treated banks. Point estimates are reported within 95% confidence intervals. The announcement
time of stress tests is in the last quarter of 2008, shown by a blue vertical line.
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Figure 1.3: This figure shows point estimate of differences between stress-tested banks and non-tested group using securities, discretionary
loan loss provisions, total loans and deposits as outcome variables. The y-axis represents outcome variables. The x-axis is the interaction term
between each quarter and treated banks. Point estimates are reported within 95% confidence intervals. The announcement time of stress
tests is in the last quarter of 2008, shown by a blue vertical line.
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Table 1.1: Definitions of Variables
Categories Name of Variables FRB Code
General
Total Assets bhck2170
Total Deposits bhdm6631 + bhdm6636 + bhfn6631
+ bhfn6636
Liquid Assets bhck0081 + bhck0395 + bhck0397
+ bhck1754 + bhck1773
Loan Portfolio Measures
Total Loans bhck2122
Loans Secured by Real Estate bhck1410
Commercial and Industrial Loans bhck1763+bhck1764
Loans to Depository Institutions bhck1288
Agricultural Loans bhck1590
Consumer Loans bhckb538+bhck2011
Total Foreign Loans bhck1764+bhck1296+bhck2081
Loan Loss and Delinquency Measures
Loan Loss Provisions bhck4230
Loan Loss Allowance bhck3123
Realized Gains bhck3196+bhck3521
Unrealized Gains bhck2221
Non-Performing Loans bhck5525+bhck5526
Net Loan Charge-offs bhbc6061
Risk Measures
Capital Asset Ratio bhck3210/bhck2170
Total Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio bhck7205
Tier1 Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio bhck7206
Tier1 Leverage Capital Ratio bhck7204
Profitability Measures
Return on Equity bhck4340/bhck3210
Return on Assets bhck4340/bhck2170
Interest Margin bhck4074/bhck2170
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Table 1.2: List of Large Bank Names
This table presents the name of banks with assets of at least $100 billion dollars and banks with
similar charactristics and below this asset threshold. The sample consists of bank holding companies
observations from the first quarter of 2005 to last quarter of 2008. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Treated Control
Bank of America BOK Financial Corporation
Wells Fargo and Company Unionbancal Corporation
GMAC LLC TCF FC
Citigroup Webster Financial Corporation
Regions Financial Corporation Marshall & Ilsley Corporation
Suntrust Banks M&T Bank Corporation
Keycorp Northern Trust Corporation
Morgan Stanley Commerce Bancshares
Fifth Third Bancorp Zion Bancorporation
PNC BC Compus Bankshares
American Express New York Community Bancorp
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation Associated Banc-corp
BB&T FC Comerica Incorporated
Capital One Corp Centura banks
Goldman Sachs BK Huntington Bancshares Incorporated
JP Morgan Chase & Co First Horizon National Corporation
Metlife Synovus Financial Corporation
State Street Boston Corp Bancwest Corporation
U.S. Bancorp Colonial bancgroup
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Table 1.3: List of Mid-Sized Bank Names
This table presents the list of treated banks with assets between $10 to $50 billion dollars and the matched
control group. The list is ranked based on highest to lowest asset sizes.
Treated Matched Control
Cit Group Inc. Glacier Bancorp, Inc.
New York Community Bancorp Inc. Wesbanco, Inc.
ETrade Financial Corporation Carver Bancorp, Inc.
Hudson City Bancorp Inc. Hf Financial Corp.
First Niagara Financial Group Inc. United Bankshares, Inc.
People’s United Financial Inc. Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc
City National Corporation Western Alliance Bancorporation
BOK Financial Corporation 1st Source Corporation
SVB Financial Group Nara Bancorp, Inc.
Synovus Financial Corp. Capital Bank Financial Corp.
East West Bancorp Inc. Independent Bank Corp.
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc. Cvb Financial Corp.
Associated Banc-Corp Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc.
Firstmerit Corporation Old National Bancorp
First Horizon National Corporation Columbia Banking System, Inc.
Commerce Bancshares Inc. Chemical Financial Corporation
Raymond James Financial Inc. Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc.
First Citizens Bancshares Inc. First Commonwealth Financial Corporation
Webster Financial Corporation Community Bank System, Inc.
Hancock Holding Company First Midwest Bancorp, Inc.
Prosperity Bancshares Inc. First Merchants Corporation
Susquehanna Bancshares Inc. Lakeland Bancorp, Inc.
TCF Financial Corporation Park National Corporation
Wintrust Financial Corporation Flushing Financial Corp
Everbank Financial Corp Northwest Bancshares Inc.
Umb Financial Corporation Bancfirst Corporation
Fulton Financial Corporation Taylor Capital Group, Inc.
Valley National Bancorp Mb Financial, Inc.
Astoria Financial Corporation Charter Financial Corp
Franklin Resources Inc. Pacwest Bancorp
Investors Bancorp Mhc Heartland Financial Usa, Inc.
Bankunited Inc. First Nbc Bank Holding Co
Washington Federal Inc. Bank Of The Ozarks Inc.
Bank Of Hawaii Corporation Nbt Bancorp Inc.
Privatebancorp Inc. S & T Bancorp, Inc.
F.N.B. Corporation Lakeland Financial Corporation
Firstbank Holding Company Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc.
Iberiabank Corporation Bancorpsouth Inc. Bnc Bancorp
Bancorpsouth, Inc. Provident Financial Services, Inc.
International Bancshares Corporation Tompkins Financial Corporation
Trustmark Corporation Union First Market Bankshares Corporation
Texas Capital Bancshares Inc. Independent BK Grp Inc.
Umpqua Holdings Corporation First Bancorp
Cathay General Bancorp Great Southern Bancorp, Inc.
Sterling Financial Corporation Rockville Financial, Inc.
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Table 1.4: Pre-Regulation Mean Test for Large Banks
This table presents the mean and change in the mean of the control and treated groups prior to the stress tests announcement.
The sample consists of large bank holding companies observations after removing four largest banks in the treated group and four
smallest banks in the control group. The sample includes quarterly data from the first quarter of 2005 to the third quarter of 2008.
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Means-Level
Control Treated Difference P-Value
Assets (in billion) 43.07 284.7 -241.6 5.7e-30
Net Loan Charge-offs/Total Loans(%) -.08694 -.09861 .01166 .4408
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans(%) .8269 .8303 -.00344 .9638
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans(%) .2546 .3916 -.1371 .01088
Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans(%) 1.195 1.247 -.05252 .4076
Table 1.5: Pre-Regulation Mean Test for Mid-sized Banks
This table presents the mean and change in the mean of the control and treated group prior to the stress tests announcement.
The sample consists of mid-sized bank holding companies observations from the first quarter of 2013 to third quarter of 2013. See
Table 1 for variable definitions.
Means-Level
Control Treated Difference P-Value
Assets(in billion) 5.358 20.49 -15.13 0
Net Loan Charge-offs/Total Loans(%) -.0776 -.06571 -.01189 .4996
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans(%) 2.14 2.011 .1289 .5339
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans(%) .1079 .1086 -.0007 .9757
Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans(%) 1.616 1.407 .2097 .00178
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Table 1.6: Pre-Regulation Mean Test
This table presents the mean and change in the mean of the control and treated groups prior to the stress tests announcement. The sample
consists of bank holding companies observations from the first quarter of 2005 to third quarter of 2008. Panel A. includes large banks as a
treated group. Panel B. includes mid-sized banks as a treated group. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Panel A. Means-Level Means-Change
Control Treated Difference P-Value Control Treated Difference P-Value
Assets (in billion) 37.47 512.6 -475.1 0 .02361 .0309 -.00729 .3736
Net Loan Charge-offs/Total Loans(%) -.08507 -.123 .03796 .00709 -.0191 -.0051 -.014 .4089
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans(%) .7773 .9978 -.2204 .00061 .1492 .152 -.00276 .9264
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans(%) .2431 .4885 -.2454 1.3e-07 .08448 .09869 -.01421 .7184
Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans(%) 1.181 1.338 -.1577 .00221 .06942 .08946 -.02004 .2384
Total Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio 11.86 12.34 -.4748 .00677 .00131 .00455 -.00324 .562
Total Deposits/Total Assets .6722 .5456 .1266 2.8e-23 .01272 .01929 -.00657 .2533
Total Loans/Total Assets .6876 .5368 .1507 1.2e-21 .01662 .01628 .00034 .9437
Return on Equity .07029 .07972 -.00944 .06114 -.08798 -.0583 -.02968 .6447
Panel B. Means-Level Means-Change
Control Treated Difference P-Value Control Treated Difference P-Value
Assets (in billion) 5.358 20.49 -15.13 0 .01596 .01206 .0039 .5737
Net Loan Charge-offs/Total Loans(%) -.0776 -.06571 -.01189 .4996 .02767 .03399 -.00632 .8784
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans(%) 2.14 2.011 .1289 .5339 -.1689 -.136 -.03286 .5104
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans(%) .1079 .1086 -.0007 .9757 -.1294 -.0983 -.03108 .5289
Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans(%) 1.616 1.407 .2097 .00178 -.02506 -.02707 .00201 .8624
Total Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio 15.26 16.27 -1.011 .1483 .0001 -.00563 .00573 .4858
Total Deposits/Total Assets .7822 .7163 .06596 .00044 .00908 .00814 .00094 .8682
Total Loans/Total Assets .6801 .6092 .07095 1.4e-05 .01394 .01021 .00373 .3905
Return on Equity .04233 .04208 .00025 .9327 -.0248 -.08076 .05596 .6014
27
Table 1.7: The Impact of Capital Adequacy on Loan Loss Variables
This table presents the results of estimation in equation (2) using net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves and
total capital ratio as outcome variables. The variable Treated has value of one for the banks with asset value of at least $100 billion in the last quarter
of 2008. The variable Post is an indicator variable with value of one in 2008q4 and after and zero otherwise. All estimates include bank and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Net Loan Charge-offs Non-Performing Loans Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Reserves Total Capital Ratio
Treated*Post -0.0977∗∗∗ 0.7769∗∗∗ 0.3223∗∗∗ 0.5309∗∗∗ 1.8164∗∗∗
(0.0345) (0.1148) (0.0978) (0.0726) (0.1733)
ysd 0.3659 1.9777 1.1054 1.2325 2.7164
ymean -.2612 2.247 .8 1.895 13.49
ar2 .506 .7985 .5317 .7925 .6989
N 738 954 954 954 960
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.8: The Impact of Capital Adequacy on Other Variables
This table presents the results of estimation in equation (2) using securities, total loans, deposits and |discretionaryloanlossprovisions| as outcome
variables. The variable Treated has value of one for the banks with asset value of at least $100 billion in the last quarter of 2008. The variable Post
is an indicator variable with value of one in 2008q4 and after and zero otherwise. All estimates include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Realized Gains (Losses) on Securities Loans Deposits |DiscretionaryLoanLossProvisions|
Treated*Post 0.0102 -0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.1977∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0864)
ysd 0.1675 0.2023 0.1788 0.7501
ymean -.0092 .5906 .6086 .6783
ar2 .1836 .9698 .9562 .221
N 960 960 956 936
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.9: The Impact of Capital Adequacy on Loan Loss Variables with Real-Estate’s Exposure
This table presents the results of estimation in equation (3) using net loan chrage-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves and
total capital ratio as outcome variables. The variable Treated has value of one for the banks with asset value of at least $100 billion in the last quarter
of 2008. Variable Real-Estate Share includes share of lagged real-estate loans from total loans. The variable Post is an indicator variable with value of
one in 2008q4 and after and zero otherwise. All estimates include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted
for clustering at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Net Charge-offs Non-Performing Loans Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Reserves TotalCapital Ratio
Treated*Post 0.1697∗∗ -0.1854 0.2138 0.4443∗∗∗ 2.0199∗∗∗
(0.0812) (0.2405) (0.2071) (0.1537) (0.3663)
Real-Estate*Treated .3469 -2.154∗∗∗ -1.977∗∗∗ -1.242∗∗∗ -3.624∗∗∗
(.2585) (.6325) (.5446) (.4042) (.9632)
Real-Estate*Treated*Post -.3753∗∗ 1.984∗∗∗ .2559 .2128 -2.45∗∗∗
(.1465) (.4268) (.3675) (.2727) (.6499)
ysd 0.3663 1.9704 1.0986 1.2255 2.7121
ymean -.2614 2.242 .7952 1.893 13.46
ar2 .5366 .8056 .5363 .7948 .762
N 736 947 947 947 947
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.10: The Impact of Capital Adequacy on Loan Loss Variables
This table presents the results of estimation in equation (2) using net loan charge-offs, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, loan loss reserves and
total capital ratio as outcome variables. The variable Treated has value of one for the banks with assets of between $10 and $50 billion in the last quarter
of 2013. The variable Post is an indicator variable with value of one in 2014q1 and after and zero otherwise. All estimates include bank and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Net Loan Charge-offs Non-Performing Loans Loan Loss Provisions Loan Loss Reserves Total Capital Ratio
Treated*Post 0.0139 0.2280∗∗ 0.0059 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.3234
(0.0129) (0.0918) (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.2200)
ysd 0.0797 1.6645 0.1745 0.4966 5.0062
ymean -.0443 1.668 .0982 1.362 15.39
ar2 .8728 .8509 .6059 .9173 .9243
N 167 798 798 798 633
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.11: The Impact of Capital Adequacy on Other Variables
This table presents the results of estimation in equation (2) using securities, total loans, deposits and |discretionaryloanlossprovisions| as outcome
variables. The variable Treated has value of one for the banks with assets of between $10 and $50 billion in the last quarter of 2013. The variable Post
is an indicator variable with value of one in 2014q1 and after and zero otherwise. All estimates include bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Realized Gains and Losses on Securities Loans Deposits |DiscretionaryLoanLossProvisions|
Treated*Post 0.0224∗∗∗ -0.0045 0.0045 0.0230∗
(0.0083) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0139)
ysd 0.0732 0.1312 0.1238 0.1280
ymean .0183 .6579 .7534 .1209
ar2 .3695 .9725 .9832 .4895
N 799 799 567 706
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Chapter 2
The Lift of the Trade Embargo and
Corporate Policies: Evidence from
the Immigrants’ Network
I Introduction
Firms have experienced a significant increase in the intensity of competition due to the globalization of
business activities, reductions in trade barriers, and technological progress. Therefore, it is essential to
understand the effect of increased competition on the corporate investment and financing decisions. The
primary goal of this paper is to examine whether an increase in the foreign competition caused by the
removal of trade barriers affects the corporate decisions such as investment, research and development
(R&D), cash holdings and financing structure. In particular, this paper aims to investigate how the
removal of the trade embargo against Vietnam affects the U.S. corporate policies, financing decisions,
and capital structure and what is the potential channel of this effect?
It is shown that corporations are more likely to trade with countries that have a strong resident
population near their firm headquarters. Cohen, Gurun, and Malloy [Cohen et al.] indicate that local
networks of Japanese residents cause more export and import between U.S. and Japan. Parsons et al.
[2014] show that the share of U.S. exports to Vietnam was higher in U.S. states with larger Vietnamese
populations after Vietnam joined WTO in 2007. Using the same natural experiment as Parsons et al.
[2014], I focus on the impact of foreign competition on U.S. corporate policies after the lift of the trade
embargo between U.S. and Vietnam in 1994. The hypothesis is lifting of the trade embargo not only
affects small economies such as Vietnam, but it can also have a real impact on U.S. corporations. Using
two historical events in the U.S. and Vietnam relations, I provide evidence on how foreign competition
affects U.S. corporate decisions.
As a result of both internal and external conflicts in Vietnam in 1975, many Vietnamese people flew
to the U.S. as refugees. On arrival to the U.S., these refugees were allocated to one of the four reception
camps and then randomly assigned around the U.S. The random allocation of refugees was deliberately
done to prevent similar agglomeration of refugees happened in the past such as Cuban people. Then,
the trade embargo against Vietnam was unexpectedly removed in 1994, after nineteen years period of no
trade between Vietnam and U.S. The combination of these two sources of variation allows me to show
that the lift of the trade embargo against Vietnam affects U.S. corporations through immigrants’ channel.
In other words, companies located in the states with a higher number of refugees respond differently to
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the embargo removal comparing to the corporations located in the states with a lower number of refugees.
Specifically, these companies adopt new strategies of decision making regarding investment, R&D, cash
holdings and financing policies.
I employ the Vietnamese event as a natural experiment to specify the causal effect of foreign com-
petition in the product market on corporate policies. The natural experiment includes two different
components. First, I use the lift of the trade embargo against Vietnam as an exogenous shock to foreign
competition, since it creates additional pressure on U.S. corporations to face the international competi-
tion in the product market. Secondly, I employ the random allocation of Vietnamese refugees in 1975 as
a source of variation to classify states into the ones highly affected by the lift of the trade embargo and
the ones less affected by the trade change in 1994. In particular, I use difference-in-difference method in
combination with an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect of foreign competition
on corporate policies. This method enables me to specify the model in a sense that the lift of the trade
embargo affects the corporate policies through international competition, and it is uncorrelated with the
unobserved variables which can potentially influence the business structure.
The empirical study of this topic is essential since the theoretical literature on how the competition
affects corporations delivers inconclusive results. An increase in competitive threats prompts companies
to engage in more aggressive corporate behavior to maintain some degree of entry barriers and preserve or
distort the rival’s action (Caves and Porter [1977] and Spence [1984]). More specifically, the competition
induces corporations to make more investment. On the other hand, companies adopt more conservative
investment choices to accommodate better lower barriers to entry either due to an uncertain business
environment or the change in the profitability of investment opportunities (Schmalensee [1981] and
Fudenberg and Tirole [1984]).
This paper identifies the immigration network as a channel through which foreign competition affects
corporations. The literature identifies two different theories for the role of immigrants’ network. First,
the preference channel in which the product market competition is much tighter if the demand for
imported goods is higher than local products. In other words, immigrants in the country of destination
increase demand for goods produced in their country of origin. The preference channel cause an increase
in the number of imported goods from the immigrants’ country of origin (Gould [1994] and Rauch and
Trindade [2002]). Secondly, the information channel in which the immigration network can reduce the
transaction costs of trade through providing more information for the trade and induce more exports to
their country of origin (Parsons et al. [2014] and Cohen, Gurun, and Malloy [Cohen et al.]). Overall, the
net effect of the embargo trade removal on corporate policies is not predicted, and empirical evidence
can shed light on the net result of an increase in foreign competition on corporations.
The empirical findings illustrate that foreign competition has a causal effect on corporate policies
through the immigrants network channel. Corporations reduce their capital expenditures in response
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to the embargo removal while they increase the R&D expenditures to improve their market share in
future. A sample one standard deviation increase in the proportion of Vietnamese refugees leads to
.046 standard deviation decrease in capital expenditures and .041 standard deviation increase in R&D
expenditures of corporations in the aftermath of the embargo removal. Besides, companies hold more
cash, issue more equity and cut their leverage after the embargo removal. I find that companies in
textile industries and located in states with a higher share of Vietnamese refugees increase investment
more than the control group. There is no significant effect in any effect in the other industries such as
miscellaneous manufacturing, agricultural or transportation. This shows that the influence of the trade
liberalization exists in industries in which Vietnamese refugees are more involved.
The corporations located in the states with a higher share of Vietnamese immigrants cut their capital
expenditures more than the companies located in the states with a lower percentage of Vietnamese
immigrants. In particular, the results provide evidence of the preference channel in which Vietnamese
demand for imported products from Vietnam is higher than the available similar local products in U.S.
Furthermore, the robustness tests support the results through implementing the placebo test and testing
the parallel trend assumption. My paper is the first in the literature to provide evidence of a natural
experiment to show the causal relationship between foreign market competition to corporations. My
results importantly provide evidence of the positive economic benefits of international competition in
increasing the efficiency of businesses and enhancing the research and development.
Although Vietnam is not among the principal trading partners with U.S., still it presents a large
portion of imports to the US. Since 1994, Vietnam’s merchandise exports to the United States have
increased rapidly, from $54.0 million in 1994 to $207.8 million in 1995, and $337.5 million in 1996.1 This
shows the positive trend of demand in U.S. for Vietnamese products. Moreover, the economic magnitude
of the effect is quite significant although Vietnam is not the major trading partner with the US. The
findings show .046 standard deviation change in U.S. corporate capital expenditures as a result of one
sample standard deviation increase in the share of refugees. The results of this paper show Vietnam has
a substantial effect on the real side of U.S. economy. Therefore, the effect of other major U.S. trading
partners would be considerable in the case of any policy changes or reforms and it is essential to know
the potential impact of these changes.
The refugee location data in 1975 are from a U.S. General Accounting Office Report to Congress2.
Migration data for the year 1995 are taken from the U.S. 2000 Census. To ensure that the immigrants’
decision to move to U.S. could not be based on the initiation of trade with Vietnam, I only include those
that migrated to the U.S. before 1994. The data of the control variables such as per capita state income
and population come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Moreover, I use accounting and
financial information of U.S. public companies from Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual
1U.N. Comtrade System, 1994-1998
2General, 1977
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database over the period 1982-2005.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on how foreign competition affects
corporate policies with a natural experiment. This paper identifies the immigrants’ network as a channel
through which international competition affects corporate policies. The nature of the two historical
events enables me to solve the endogeneity problem and helps me to identify a causal effect of foreign
competition to corporate policies. The findings of this paper shed new light to policymakers on the
debate about lifting the trade embargo against U.S. and Cuba and the potential impact of such a policy
on U.S. corporations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the conceptual framework of how
the reduction of trade barriers such as the lift in the trade embargo can affect the corporate policies and
the related literature. Section 3 provides the historical overview on the Vietnamese immigration to the
US. Section 4 provides the empirical strategy of this paper including the difference-in-differences approach
in combination with the instrumental variable, OLS and 2SLS specifications. Section 5 presents the data
and summary statistics of immigration as well as financial variables. Section 6 shows the results of the
paper, including the main results of reduced form model, robustness tests, OLS and 2SLS specifications
and section 8 summarizes the paper and concludes.
II Conceptual Framework
This section provides a summary of the existing literature on the economic effects of trade liberalization.
Trade liberalization increases the foreign competition in the product market. Moreover, it explains the
two possible channels, the preference channel, and the information channel through which the immigrants’
network can affect the corporate structure. In general, the preference channel induces a decrease in
investment since the immigrants demand more products of their origin country. While, the information
channel increases the investment since it lowers the costs of gathering information.
An increase in the foreign competition implies that firms are increasingly exposed to competitive
pressure. The increase in the level of import in the industry creates competition for domestic companies.
The reason is foreign products have a bigger presence in the market. Furthermore, changes in foreign
competition can reshape the structure of industry. Once foreign firms decide to export into a market,
they are unlikely to exit (Baldwin [1988] and Baldwin and Krugman [1989]). Therefore, an increase in
international competition creates an increase in competitive pressure for the industry. The impact of
foreign trade and import competition offers potential and competition within domestic product markets.
The industrial organization literature answers the question of how the firm entry affects productivity
growth and markup of incumbents. Firm entry into a market has led to faster total factor productivity
growth in incumbent domestic companies and thus to faster aggregate productivity growth. Foreign
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competition has a negative effect on industry profitability and such competition, as represented by the
level of imports. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that less restrictive trade policies encour-
age more competitive pricing in domestic industries (Esposito and Esposito [1971]). Trade liberalization
opens the door of the incumbent country to the foreign market. The entry of foreign products into the
market imposes competition in the product market.
There exist two opposing views regarding the effect of entry and trade liberalization on growth. On
the one hand, the entry and trade liberalization proponents argue that by increasing the size of markets,
liberalization enhances growth (Frankel and Romer [1999]). On the contrary, others have instead argued
that liberalization can be detrimental to growth, by inhibiting infant industries and learning-by-doing
(Acemoglu et al. [2006] and Young [1991]) or by increasing the market uncertainty for less financially
constraint incumbents and force them to postpone their investment decisions (Schmalensee [1981], or
Fudenberg and Tirole [1984]). The reduction of import tariffs lowers the cost of entering the U.S.
product markets and facilitate the entrance of foreign rivals on domestic markets. Goods and services
supplied by foreign competitors become relatively cheaper on local markets. The reductions of import
tariffs intensify the competitive pressure on domestic producers. The trade liberalization impact firms’
corporate policies and capital structure through changing the product market competition.
There are two opposing views on how lower barriers to entry could affect the investment of incumbent
firms. Based on the first view, an increase in competitive threats prompts firms to engage in more
aggressive corporate behavior to maintain some degree of entry barriers and preserve or enhance their
competitive position. As emphasized by Caves and Porter [1977] and Spence [1984], incumbent firms
may decide to expand as an attempt to distort rivals’ actions. Fudenberg and Tirole [1983] and Dixit
[1980] predict that incumbents could increase investment to deter the entry or expansion of potential
competitors. By investing more today in production capacity, technology, and product differentiation,
the incumbent firms aim at lowering the expected payoffs of foreign rivals and limiting their entry on
U.S. markets.
Empirical evidence related to the investment view is scarce and mainly focuses on particular indus-
tries. Gilbert and Lieberman [1987] find that investment reduces the probability that rivals expand
capacity in U.S. chemical product industries temporarily. Khanna and Tice [2000] document increases
in investment among certain incumbent supermarket chains when Walmart enters their local markets
and only financially weak incumbents respond to Wal-Mart’s entry with a lower level of capital invest-
ment. More recently, Simintzi [2013] documents that U.K. manufacturing firms tend to increase capital
investment preemptively when a local rival announces a restructuring that improves its competitive po-
sition. Moreover, the incumbent firms could improve their financial situation and invest in liquid assets
to sustain better or to deter the increased presence of foreign competitors on domestic markets (Telser
[1966], and Bolton and Scharfstein [1990]). Haushalter et al. [2007] and Hoberg et al. [2014] document
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a positive association between investments in liquid assets and the degree of competition.
The second view argues that the market competition reduces investment. Competitive threats lower
incumbents’ prospects and make their business environment more uncertain. As a result, firms adopt
more conservative investment choices to accommodate better lower barriers to entry. For instance, and
as showed by Schmalensee [1981] and Fudenberg and Tirole [1984], incumbents could choose a strategic
underinvestment and restrict their capacity expansion till the entry occurs. Also, incumbents could
scale down the investment because competitive threats erode the attractiveness of investment projects
by reducing their profitability Grenadier [2002] or amplifying business uncertainty (Gaspar and Massa
[2006] and Irvine and Pontiff [2009]).
Trade liberalization exposes firms with foreign competition, and companies react to the competition
by increasing their investment or decreasing it. The product market competition is much tighter if the
demand for imported goods is higher than local products. The increase in demand for imported goods
can be induced by the preference channel meaning that migrants increase demand for goods produced in
their foreign country. The preference channel causes an increase in the number of imported goods from
the immigrants’ country of origin.
The existing investment opportunities in the product market are no more profitable. Thus, the
incumbents decrease their investment as a reaction to the existence of imported goods in the market.
The incumbent firm might react to increase its investment in research and development projects to
introduce newer products to the market. On the other hand, the immigration network can reduce the
transaction costs of trade through the information channel and induce more exports to their country of
origin. Therefore, the incumbent firm may increase their investment to expand their production market
internationally and take advantage of the existed opportunity.
In general, the preference channel induces a decrease in investment since the immigrants demand
more products of their origin country. Information channel predicts an increase in investment. The
presence of immigrants lowers the transaction costs of trade and cause more investment at the corporate
level to expand internationally. Overall, the total effect of competition on investment is theoretically
ambiguous which makes this an interesting empirical question. It is crucial to investigate how the product
market competition affects the corporate policies, and, in particular, which underlying mechanism; the
preference channel or the information channel dominates.
As outlined in Tirole [1988], the impact of trade liberalization on firms’ investment choices depends
on the firms’ incentives to either deter the potential entry and delay the expansion of foreign competitors,
or allow entry and prepare for the later competition if rivals penetrate into U.S. markets. The literature
linking the industrial organization to corporate finance suggests that, in equilibrium, this choice is
determined by the costs of preventing entry as well as the anticipations of U.S. firms about the reaction
of foreign rivals. While it ’s hard to measure these incentives and costs empirically, I hypothesize that the
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immigrants’ network can affect the corporate choices through preference channel or information channel
after the removal of trade barriers.
III Historical Background
The first round of Vietnamese refugees flew to the United States in 1975. The first series of Vietnamese
refugees establishes the underlying dispersed immigrants’ network for the specification. The Vietnamese
refugees were randomly allocated to different states in the U.S. This particular feature of the historical
event enables me to isolate the immigration choices driven by the states amenities from the immigrants’
location. Also, this section explains how and why the trade embargo against Vietnam was ended by
President Clinton in 1994. I employ the lift of the embargo as an exogenous shock to the foreign
competition to solve the endogeneity issues of product market competition.
In 1975, the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act facilitated the entry of the first wave of
Vietnamese refugees to the U.S. Because many Vietnamese immigrants forced to move from their country
due to many internal and external conflicts. The U.S. was the largest recipient of Vietnamese refugees.
The first round of refugees were allocated to one of four reception centers in California, Pennsylvania,
Arkansas and Florida. After the closure of these camps in the last quarter of 1975, the first wave of
Vietnamese refugees was deliberately dispersed in the U.S to prevent agglomeration of refugees (Parsons
et al. [2014]). President Clinton lifted the trade embargo on 3 February 1994, as a result of an increased
lobbying by domestic private firms with an attempt to start a business in Vietnam. In 2000, a bilateral
trade agreement was signed between the two countries. After the trade agreement, the trade tariff on
Vietnamese imports to the U.S. decreased from 40% to 3%.
IV Empirical Strategy
This section describes my identification strategy in order to identify the causal effect of foreign compe-
tition on corporate structure. I employ a difference-in-differences method in combination with reduced
form model, OLS and 2SLS specifications in the estimations. To solve the endogeneity problems, I employ
the lift of the trade embargo against Vietnam in 1994 as a natural experiment. The lift of the embargo
is as an exogenous shock to the product market competition in U.S. The Vietnamese random allocation
shaped nineteen years prior to the removal of the trade embargo induces corporations differently to this
exogenous shock. The immigrants network located in United States play a major role in shaping the
mechanism under which the lift of the embargo affects corporate policies.
The first wave of Vietnamese refugees to the U.S. was exogenously allocated across the U.S. in 1975.
I also employ another episode of history which is trade embargo of Vietnam by the U.S. was in force until
1994. Thus, no trade happens between U.S. and Vietnam during 1975 till 1994 due to the embargo. The
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lift of the trade embargo in 1994, suddenly induces firms to foreign competition. Firms react differently
to this exogenous shock depending on the existing Vietnamese network shaped in each states.
The flow of Vietnamese refugees to U.S. in 1975 allows me to construct the treatment and control
group in a random way in a sense that the corporations located in states with higher share of refugees
are more likely to be affected by the foreign product market competition relative to the corporations
located in states with lower share of refugees. The exogenous allocation of Vietnamese immigrants in
1975 allows me to instrument the 1995 migrants stock and mitigate the concerns over the endogeneity
issues. The most important aspect of the distribution of Vietnamese refugees in 1975, is that the refugees
themselves had no choice on where they could reside, such that their location decision was exogenous.
I focus on the first wave of Vietnamese refugees in 1975 as the source of variation for the two main
reasons. First, the immigrants that arrived prior to the lift of the trade embargo are randomly assigned
to different states of U.S. It is known that immigrants usually move to the states with lower costs of living
or better working opportunities. The random allocation of Vietnamese across different states allows me
to rule out any concern over the endogenous immigration choices. Secondly, this feature eliminates the
concerns over the effect of reverse causality from corporate investment policies to immigration. It is
well accepted that the states with booming businesses and lower unemployment absorb more number of
immigrants. Since, the Vietnamese are randomly allocates to different states, here the reverse causality
is not an issue and cannot bias the estimates.
I employ a difference-in-differences approach in combination with instrumental variable to explore
the effect of the lift of embargo in 1994 on corporate policies. The states are randomly assigned to
treatment and control group based on the number of Vietnamese refugees. The distribution in 1995
was in large part determined by the initial allocation of refugees in 1975. The correlation between the
Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995 with Veitnamese refugees share of population in 1975
is 0.986, showing that the instrument will subsequently be strong. Thus, I use the exogenous allocation
of Vietnamese refugees in 1975 as an instrument for the stock of Vietnamese migrants across U.S. states
in 1995.
The hypothesis is the corporations located in the states with higher share of refugees (treatment
group) are prone to foreign competition relative to the corporations located in the states with lower share
of refugees (control group) in the aftermath of the embargo removal. The treatment group experience
tighter foreign competition as a result of the higher demand for imported goods from local Vietnamese
residence or lower transaction cost for trade as a result of Vietnamese network formed in these states.
The following specifications show the identification strategy to test the hypothesis. Equation (1) shows
a difference-in-differences approach with OLS specifications using the share of Vietnamese immigrants’
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share of population in 1995 as the treatment group.
Yist = δ + γ1Imms + γ2Postt + γ3Imms ∗ Postt + γ4Xist + εist (2.1)
I consider twelve years before and after the lift of the trade embargo in 1994 starting from 1982 to
2005. The variable Imms include the Vietnamese share of population in 1995. The variable Postt is
an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. I control for
corporate characteristics such as size, market-to-book and cash flow in the regressions. I also control for
per capital income of state in the estimation to capture the state observable characteristics. I use state
and year fixed effect to mitigate the effect of unobservable state differences.
The outcome variables are corporate investment measured by capital expenditures, research and
development and acquisition expenditures. Also I use the corporate cash holdings, financing variables
and performance measures as alternative outcomes. The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is the
interaction term, γ3, showing the effect of the lift of embargo on corporate policies through the channel
of immigrants network. The standard errors are clustered within states to address the serial correlation
between clusters.
The main estimation of the paper is using a difference-in-differences approach in combination with
reduced form specifications. I employ the share of Vietnamese refugees in 1975 as an instrument for share
of Vietnamese immigrants in 1995. I directly use the share of refugees instead of Immigrants in equation
(1). The correlation between the Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995 with Vietnamese
refugees share of population in 1975 is 0.986, showing that the instrument will subsequently be strong.
The interaction term between share of refugees and post 1994 captures the main effect of trade embargo
on corporate policies.
In addition, I employ difference-in-difference approach in combination with 2SLS specifications to
rule out any concerns over the endogeneity choices of immigration. Equation (2) shows the first stage
of the 2SLS specifications. In this equation, I use the Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975,
Refs to explain the Vietnamese share of population in 1995 Imms. I control for the per capital income
of each state as a measure of local state characteristics. The predicted value of Imms in the first stage
is used to estimate the second stage of specifications.
Imms = α+ β1Refs + β2Wst + s (2.2)
Yist = δ + γ1 ˆImms + γ2Postt + γ3 ˆImms ∗ Postt + γ4Xist + εist (2.3)
Equation (3) shows the result of the second stage of 2SLS specifications. In this estimation, I consider
the predicted value of predicted immigrants as the treatment group. In other words, the states with higher
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share of predicted Immigrants are the one affected more by the lift of embargo. Moreover, I use cash
holdings and financing decisions such as net debt financing and net equity issuance as outcome variables.
Also, the capital structure such as long and short term leverage are explored.
Finally, the corporate performance variables such as return to equity, profit margin and sales growth
are used as outcomes. The i index stands for corporation, s for state and t for year. The coefficient of
interest in equation (2) is γ3. This coefficient shows how the lift of the embargo post 1994 period affect
the corporate policies through immigrants network channel. In the second stage of estimation, I control
for size, market-to-book, cash flow and state per capital income of state. Also, I use state and year fixed
effects. The standard errors are clustered at state level.
V Data Description
This section introduces the data sets used in this paper which are on refugees’ location and migration
data. Also, the control variables at the state level such as per capital state income and population are
presented in this section. The accounting and financial data of U.S. public companies and the appropriate
filters are explained in details.
The 1975 refugee location data are obtained from a U.S. General Accounting Office Report to
Congress3. It provides the numbers of refugees resettled in the state as of 31st December 1975. This is
the last day of camp closure that Vietnamese refugees are randomly dispersed across states. Migration
data for the year 1995 are from the U.S. 2000 Census. The cities with the largest Vietnamese populations
in 1995 were San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Houston. The data of the control variables such as per
capita state income and population come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Migration data
for the year 1995 are from the US 2000 Census. I report the number of Vietnamese in 1995 as well as
the Vietnamese share of immigrants and share of the population in 1995. I also indicate the number of
Vietnamese refugees in 1975 and the refugees share of the population in 1975.
I use accounting and financial data of U.S. public companies from Compustat’s North America Fun-
damentals Annual database over the period 1982-2005. I collected the data on investment including
capital, R&D, and acquisition expenditures, on cash holdings, moreover on financing structure of the
firm including net debt financing, net equity issuance, long-term and short-term leverage. Finally, I
consider the corporate performance measures such as profit margin, return on equity and sales growth.
I also consider size, market-to-book and cash flow as control variables in the regression. I provide the
definition of financial variables in Compustat database (see table 2.1).
I exclude financial firms ranging from 6000 to 6999 in SIC codes. I drop the observations with a
negative asset, sales, capital, R&D and acquisition expenditures and cash holdings. I also exclude the
3General, 1977
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firms with the sale growth more than five. Moreover, I drop the firms if their capital expenditures or
cash holding is larger than the asset. I winsorize all the variables at 1% level in each tail. The summary
statistics of the corporate variables regarding the investment, cash holdings, financing and performance
as well as immigration variables are presented (see table 2.2).
VI Results
This section presents the empirical results of the paper. As an identification strategy, I employ the
difference-in-differences approach in the estimations. The reduced form model presents the main results
of the paper and is presented in section A. In section B, I present the robustness tests such as falsification
check and evidence to support parallel trend assumption. In section C, I present the results of OLS
specifications. Finally, section D provides the results of 2SLS specifications.
The main results suggest that the corporations located in the states with higher number of Vietnamese
refugees cut their capital expenditures more than corporations located in the states with lower number of
Vietnamese refugees. In addition, the paper examines the effect of the lift of embargo on other financial
outcomes such as R&D expenditures, financial policies, capital structure and performance measures.
A Reduced Form Specifications
This section presents the main results of the paper. To mitigate the concerns of endogenous immigration
choices, I use the Vietnamese refugees’ share of population in 1975 as a proxy for Vietnamese immigrants
share of population in 1995. I explore different corporate investment, financing decisions, capital structure
and performance measures as the outcome variables. In general, the results show the significant effect
of foreign competition on corporate policies and structure. In other words, the lift of the trade embargo
against Vietnam has substantial significant impact on corporations.
I find that companies in textile industries and located in states with a higher share of Vietnamese
refugees increase investment more than the control group. There is no significant effect in any effect
in the other industries such as miscellaneous manufacturing, agricultural or transportation. This shows
that the influence of the trade liberalization exists in industries in which Vietnamese refugees are more
involved (see table 2.3). The corporations locate in the states with higher share of refugees decrease their
capital expenditures more than the corporations located in the states with lower number of refugees (see
table 2.4).
Using the capital expenditures as the outcome variable, the coefficient of interest which is the in-
teraction term between refugees share of population in 1975 and post 1994 is significant at .01 level
and negative (see column 1). In the estimations, I control for other observables affecting the capital
expenditures such as size, market-to-book, cash flow and per capital income of state. To be certain that
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the results are not driven by the unobservable differences in various states, I control for the state fixed
effect as well as year fixed effect.
Moreover, the corporations incorporated into the states with higher share of refugees increase their
R&D expenditures following the lift of the trade embargo in 1994 relative to the corporations incorporated
into the states with lower number of refugees (see column 2). The lift of the trade embargo does not
affect the acquisitions expenditures in corporations (see column 3). In addition, the total investment
of treated corporations, the ones located in the states with higher share of refugees are larger than the
control group of the sample (see column 4).
To find out the actual effect of each variable on the outcome, I compute the economic magnitude of
coefficients in the reduced form specifications. The standardized coefficients are reported in table 4 of the
paper. The results show a one sample standard deviation increase in refugees share of population after
the lift of the embargo leads to a decrease of .046 standard deviation in capital expenditures, holding all
other variables constant (see column 1). The other control variables such as size, market-to-book and
cash flow have approximately the same magnitude of effect on capital expenditures.
The results show the effect of refugees share is substantial and comparable to other observable ac-
counting variables in corporations. The magnitude effect of refugees share on R&D expenditures is quite
the same as its effect on capital expenditures. A one sample standard deviation increase in refugees share
of population after the lift of the embargo leads to an increase of .041 standard deviation in R&D expen-
ditures, holding all other variables constant (see column 2). Furthermore, the effect on total investment
is positive and .023 in magnitude (see column 4).
The effect of refugees’ share of population on financing decisions and capital structure is also evident
(see table 2.5). The results show refugees share of population after the lift of the embargo has significant
effect on net equity issuance of corporations as a source of external financing (see column 2), while the
share of refugees do not affect the net debt financing (see column 1). Similar to previous estimations,
I control for the observables accounting variables such as size, market-to-book and cash flow as well as
per capital income of state as one of the state’s characteristics. Also, I use state and year fixed effects
to address the concerns over the effect of unobservables and the changes through time.
Furthermore, the refugees share affects the capital structure of corporations in terms of both long-
term (see column 4) and short-term leverage (see column 3). In general, corporations in the states with
higher share of refugees decrease their leverage ratio in response to the lift of the trade embargo post
1994. The results show the corporations response to the uncertainty of the market by increasing their
net equity issuance as a source of external financing and decreasing their leverage.
A one standard deviation increase in refugees share post 1994, increases the net equity issuance by
.019 standard deviation. Moreover, a sample one standard deviation increase in refugees share after the
lift of the embargo leads to a .03 standard deviation decrease in short-term leverage and 0.47 standard
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deviation decrease in long-term leverage. The results show the corporations located in the states with
higher share of refugees adopt a different financing and leverage structure following the lift of the trade
embargo in 1994.
Using the reduced form specifications, the results show the effect of refugees share on level of cash
holdings in corporations post 1994 as well as the effect on their performance measured by sales growth
(see table 2.6). The corporations located in the states with higher share of refugees hold more cash after
the lift of the trade embargo against Vietnam relative to the corporations located in states with lower
share of refugees (see column 1).
Using three different measures of corporate performance such as profit margin, return on equity and
sales growth, the results show the share of refugees affects the sales growth at .01 significance level. The
sales growth of corporations located in states with higher share of refugees is higher than the control
group post 1994 (see column 4). The profit margin and return on equity are not affected by the refugees’
share of population (see columns 2 and 3). Similar to previous estimations, I control for size, market-
to-book, cash flow and per capital income of state in all the regressions. I also use state and year fixed
effects in estimations.
To investigate the economic magnitude of the effect, I standardized the coefficients in the regressions.
A sample one standard deviation increase in refugees share of population leads to .098 standard deviation
increase in level of cash holdings, keeping all other variables constant. A sample one standard deviation
increase in share of refugees increase the corporations’ sales growth by .019 standard deviation. The
results show the effect of the lift of embargo on corporate cash holdings and sales growth using the
refugees’ share of population as the demand channel of foreign products.
B Robustness Tests
This section provides additional supporting evidence of the results using two different tests such as
falsification and parallel trend assumption test. I use the year 1991 as the placebo year of the embargo
removal. The result indicates that the effect of lift of embargo on corporate structure does not exist at
the year 1991 instead of 1994. Furthermore, I test the parallel trend assumption to verify whether the
difference between treatment and control group is simply a trend effect or not. The result shows that the
treatment and control group are not systematically different prior to the lift of the embargo. In other
words, the parallel trend assumption holds and the paper’s results cannot be attributed to a trend effect.
As the first robustness test, I perform the falsification test using the year 1991 as a placebo year of
the embargo removal. I present the results of difference-in-difference approach using the refugees share of
population in 1975 as a proxy for Vietnamese share of population in 1995 (see table 2.7). I expect to see
an insignificant interaction term between the refugees share and post year 1991. Using different corporate
variables such as capital expenditure, R&D expenditure and total investment as outcome variables, the
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interaction term is insignificant post year 1991 (see column 1, 2 and 3).
The falsification test supports the idea that the corporations incorporated in states with higher share
of refugees adjust their corporate policies, financing decisions and capital structure in the aftermath of
the removal of the trade embargo and not in any other period of time. The results provide evidence that
the lift of the embargo in 1994, open the U.S. market to the Vietnamese product market. As the result
of an increase in foreign competition, the U.S. corporations cut their capital expenditures and leverage
while increasing their R&D expenditures and cash holdings.
To test that the effect cannot be attributed to an existing trend effect, I test whether the parallel trend
assumption holds in the difference-in-difference approach (see table 2.8). In particular, I test whether the
treatment and control group of corporations have similar characteristics prior to the lift of the embargo.
To investigate this test, first I separate the states with high refugees share of population (85 percentile
and over) from the states with low refugees share of population (15 percentile and less). Then, I compare
the distribution of the capital expenditure growth between the high and low state groups, prior to 1994.
I expect to observe insignificant results of t-test and z-value. Since, this shows the similarity between
treatment and control group prior to the lift of the embargo.
The results of the t-test shows the means of the capital expenditure growth are similar between the two
groups and the t-test is not statistically significant (see column 2). Moreover, the median of the capital
expenditure growth between two groups is also similar following the Wilcoxon test (see column 4). These
results provide supporting evidence that the treatment and control corporations are not systematically
different prior to the lift of the embargo and they have similar distributions. In general, the findings can
purely be attributed to the effect of embargo removal and immigrations network channel.
C OLS Specifications
This section provides the results of the difference-in-difference approach with OLS specifications. I use the
share of Vietnamese immigrants in 1995 as an explanatory variable. The result of the OLS specifications
show the lift of the trade embargo has effect on corporations located in the states with higher share
of Vietnamese immigrants (see table 2.9). The treated corporations decrease the capital expenditures
while increase R&D expenditures in response to the embargo removal. Although, the magnitude of the
OLS specifications is less than the results of the reduced form specification presented in section A of the
results, still the OLS specifications provide significant results in the same direction as reduced form.
The embargo removal effects the financing structure of corporations in the states with higher share
of Vietnamese immigrants (see table 2.10). The treated corporations increase their net equity issuance
in response to the embargo removal using the OLS specification (see column 2). The magnitude of the
OLS specification is significant but less than the reduced form magnitude. In contrast to the reduced
form specification, the trade embargo does not affect the leverage of the treated corporations using OLS
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specifications (see column 3 and 4).
The performance of the corporations measured by return on equity is affected by the embargo removal
using OLS specifications (see table 2.11, column 3). In contrast to the reduced form specifications, the
embargo removal does not affect the cash holdings and other performance measures in treated corpora-
tions (see column 1, 2 and 4). The reduced form specifications present reliable results in comparison to
OLS specifications.
D 2SLS Specifications
This section provides the results of a difference-in-differences approach using 2SLS specifications. As
the first stage of the specifications, I use the refugees’ share of population in 1975 as the instrument of
Vietnamese share of population in 1995 (see table 2.12). A one standard deviation increase in refugees
share of population in 1975 leads to one .44 standard deviation increase in Vietnamese share of population
in 1995 (see column 2). The share of refugees in 1975 is highly correlated with share of immigrants in
1995, while uncorrelated to the unobservables explaining the share of Vietnamese immigrants. This table
shows the immigrants network formation following the exodus of Vietnamese refugees to U.S. From this
estimation, I use the predicted value of the share of Vietnamese immigrants as an instrument for the
second stage of the specifications.
I use a difference-in-differences approach in combination with 2SLS specifications to estimate the
effect of embargo removal on corporate investment policies (see table 2.13). To this end, I employ
the predicted value of the share of Vietnamese immigrants from the first stage of the specifications.
The interaction term is between the predicted value of the share of Vietnamese immigrants and post
1994. The corporations located in states with higher share of predicted Vietnamese have lower capital
expenditures and higher R&D expenditures in comparison to the corporations in other states (see column
1 and 2). The embargo removal does not affect the total investment in treated corporations in general
(see column 4). The results of the 2SLS approach is consistent with reduced form specifications but with
lower magnitudes.
The net equity issuance is higher in treated corporations using a difference-in-differences approach
in combination with 2SLS specifications (see table 2.14, column 2). The corporations located in states
with higher share of predicted Vietnamese immigrants have lower long-term leverage in comparison to
the corporations located in the states with lower share of predicted Vietnamese immigrants (see column
4). The embargo removal does not affect either net debt financing or short-term leverage (see column 1
and 3). The results of the 2SLS approach is consistent with reduced form specifications but with lower
magnitudes.
The embargo removal affects the cash holdings of corporations and their performance measured by
sales growth using the predicted share of Vietnamese as a channel (see table 2.15). Using the 2SLS
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specifications, the treated corporations have higher cash holdings and sales growth in comparison to
the control corporations (see column 1 and 4). The 2SLS specifications provide consistent results with
reduced form model but less in magnitude.
Based on the results of the 2SLS specifications, corporations located in the states with higher predicted
share of Vietnamese immigrants have higher R&D expenditures, net equity issuance, cash holdings and
sales growth and lower capital expenditures and long-term leverage ratio. The direction of the effect is
consistent with reduced form specifications but lower in economic magnitude.
VII Conclusion
This paper identifies that the lift of the trade embargo between U.S. and Vietnam in 1994 has a significant
impact on corporate policies, financing decisions and capital structure. In particular, the corporate
decisions in terms of capital and R&D expenditures, cash holdings, equity issuance and leverage are
affected by the foreign competition. I exploit the random allocation of Vietnamese refugees in U.S. in
1975 as a natural experiment to explore the effect of foreign competition on corporate investment and
financing structure.
Based on the estimation results, I show the effect of foreign competition on capital expenditures is
through the immigrants’ network. I find the impact of foreign competition on capital expenditures only
exists in textile industry and not any other industries. Corporations reduce their capital expenditures in
response to the trade barriers removal, while they increase the R&D expenditures to increase their market
share in future. Corporations also hold more cash, issue more equity and cut their leverage after the
embargo removal as a response to the uncertain environment. My paper is therefore the first to provide
evidence from a natural experiment to show the causal relationship from foreign market competition to
corporations.
This paper tries to build a bridge between different field of economics such as labor (immigration),
industrial organization (competition), international trade (trade embargo) and corporate finance (invest-
ment) literature to show a causal effect of foreign competition on corporate policies. I find an increase in
foreign competition has a negative, significant effect on capital expenditures, while firms increase their
R&D expenditures as a response to the embargo removal. Immigrants’ network formed prior to the
embargo removal provides the demand channel through which competition affects corporations.
The corporations located in the states with higher share of Vietnamese immigrants cut their capital
expenditures more than the corporations located in states with lower share of Vietnamese immigrants.
In general, the immigrants’ network play a major role in transmitting the foreign competition shock to
the real economy. My results importantly provide evidence of the positive economic benefits of foreign
competition in increasing the efficiency of businesses and enhancing the research and development. The
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findings of this paper shed new light on how to make critical decisions in corporations, especially in the
aftermath of a policy change or reform.
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Table 2.1: Variables Definition
This table provides definitions of the main financial variables. All the financial variables
are constructed from the Compustat dataset and measured from 1982 to 2005.
Definition in Terms of Compustat Variables
asset AT
size log of AT
capital expenditures CAPX/AT
R&D expenditures XRD/AT
acquisitions expenditures AQC/AT
total investment (CAPX+XRD+AQC)/AT
cash holdings CHE/AT
market-to-book (AT-CEQ+(CSHO*PRCC F))/AT
cash flow IBC/AT
net debt financing (DLCCH+DLTIS-DLTR)/AT
net equity issuance (SSTK-PRSTKC)/AT
long-term leverage DLTT/AT
short-term leverage DLC/AT
profit margin (IB+DP)/SALE
return on equity NI/CEQ
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of all the variables used in the estimations. Panel A includes the summary statistics of
immigration variables. Panel B includes the summary statistics of financial variables in corporations. The columns show the number
of observations, mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and maximum are shown, respectively.
Variables Number of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p25 Median p75 Max
Panel A. Immigration Variables Information
number of vietnamese in 1995 51 15568.75 51428.5 1240 4634 11773 364192
vietnamese share of immigrants in 1995 51 .181 .195 .06 .12 .23 1.15
vietnamese share of population in 1995 51 3.00 2.237 1.27 2.59 4.32 11.7
number of vietnamese refugees in 1975 51 2773.784 4514.537 545 1444 3352 30495
refugees share of population in 1975 51 .001 .0004 .0003 .0005 .001 .0027
Panel B. Corporations Accounting Information
capital expenditures 131660 .067 .072 .021 .045 .085 .425
capital expenditures share of state 131659 .009 .027 .001 .002 .007 1
R&D expenditures 69232 .091 .155 .003 .035 .109 1.003
acquisitions expenditures 124967 .018 .055 0 0 0 .336
capital and R&D expenditures 69232 .152 .166 .054 .104 .187 1.429
total investment 66560 .170 .175 .063 .120 .212 1.107
total investment share of state 66560 .0180 .058 .002 .005 .013 1
cash holdings 131660 .154 .202 .017 .063 .209 .880
market-to-book 115777 2.194 2.532 1.059 1.399 2.212 18.988
cash flow 131536 -.100 .445 -.066 .025 .065 .273
size 131660 4.464 2.373 2.790 4.416 6.100 10.425
net debt financing 67642 .0164 .154 -.024 0 .039 .845
net equity issuance 121344 .061 .195 0 .0001 .014 1.110
total financing 62979 .077 .253 -.023 .006 .087 1.955
long-term leverage 131456 .202 .223 .0104 .143 .313 1.125
short-term leverage 131503 .086 .184 .002 .024 .082 1.319
profit margin 130527 -.413 2.524 -.0124 .056 .1167 .635
return on equity 131629 -.020 1.176 -.073 .085 .167 5.329
sales growth 131813 .172 .522 -.039 .080 .253 2.813
per capital income of state 131813 24021.47 7856.033 17563 23340 29681 56100
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Table 2.3: Investment Policies as Dependent Variables using Reduced Form Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using the reduced form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift
in embargo on corporate investment policies. The outcome variable is corporate investment decisions, capital expenditures. I consider textile,
services, miscellaneous manufacturing, agricultural and transportation. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital
income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting variables
presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975 a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants share of population
in 1995. The variable post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. The interaction term
between refugees share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for
clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
capital expenditures capital expenditures capital expenditures capital expenditures capital expenditures
Textile Services Misc Manufacturing Agriculture Transportation
refugees share*post1994 99.31*** -8.827*** -6.843 13.37 1.303
(21.26) (2.893) (25.6) (22.79) (4.927)
size .0053 .0022* -.0026 -2.4e-04 -.0013
(.0031) (.0013) (.0071) (.0045) (.0028)
market-to-book .0144* .0013*** .0013 .0038 .0042***
(.007) (2.9e-04) (.0026) (.0052) (.0012)
cash flow .0346 -.013*** -.0102 6.7e-04 -.0041
(.0312) (.0017) (.0229) (.033) (.0069)
per capital income of state -5.3e-07 9.3e-08 -1.1e-06 1.8e-06 3.2e-07
(4.0e-06) (5.7e-07) (2.2e-06) (3.4e-06) (7.5e-07)
ysd 0.0521 0.0789 0.0632 0.0659 0.0777
ymean .0597 .0654 .0602 .0588 .0868
ar2 .3056 .4926 .4255 .4039 .4794
N 314 2.2e+04 416 452 1.2e+04
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Investment Policies as Dependent Variables using Reduced Form Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using the reduced form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift
in embargo on corporate investment policies. The outcome variables are corporate investment decisions including the capital expenditures, R&D
expenditures, acquisition expenditures and total investment. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital income in
all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting variables presented in
Table 1. I consider the Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975 a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995. The
variable post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. The interaction term between refugees
share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
capital expenditures R&D expenditures acquisitions expenditures total investment
refugees share of population*post1994 -6.965∗∗∗ 12.31∗∗ -.919 7.967∗
(2.161) (5.548) (1.455) (4.683)
size .0023∗∗∗ -.0056∗∗∗ .0033∗∗∗ 9.8e-04
(3.9e-04) (5.5e-04) (1.7e-04) (6.7e-04)
market-to-book .0017∗∗∗ .0082∗∗∗ -8.7e-05 .0096∗∗∗
(3.3e-04) (7.1e-04) (1.1e-04) (8.4e-04)
cash flow -.0025 -.1422∗∗∗ 7.3e-04 -.1502∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0105) (6.9e-04) (.0117)
per capital income of state -1.5e-06∗∗∗ 1.9e-06∗ 2.5e-07∗ 2.8e-06∗∗∗
(1.7e-07) (1.1e-06) (1.5e-07) (9.3e-07)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.069 0.413 0.034 0.312
N 115675 63573 109871 61020
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
51
Table 2.5: Financing Decisions and Capital Structure as Dependent Variables using Reduced Form Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using reduced form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift in
embargo on financing decisions and capital structure. The outcome variables are financing decisions such as net debt financing and net equity
issuance. Also, the short-term and long-term leverage choices are included as dependent variables. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash
flow and state per capital income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial
accounting variables presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamees refugees share of population in 1975 as an instrument for the Vietnamese
immigrants share of population in 1995. The variable Post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero
otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year
and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
net debt financing net equity issuance short-term leverage long-term leverage
refugees share of population*post1994 -.9571 8.163∗∗ -10.7∗ -20.49∗∗
(4.165) (3.331) (5.42) (7.895)
size .0043∗∗∗ -.0091∗∗∗ -.0082∗∗∗ .0258∗∗∗
(4.2e-04) (5.3e-04) (6.9e-04) (.0013)
market-to-book .0044∗∗∗ .0231∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ -.0058∗∗∗
(3.9e-04) (8.0e-04) (4.7e-04) (.001)
cash flow -.0736∗∗∗ -.0818∗∗∗ -.1436∗∗∗ -.0915∗∗∗
(.0035) (.0039) (.0058) (.0044)
per capital income of state -7.5e-07 1.4e-07 -1.2e-06 -2.3e-06∗∗
(1.2e-06) (6.3e-07) (7.3e-07) (9.3e-07)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.072 0.233 0.210 0.099
N 58509 106067 115549 115490
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Performance Measures as Dependent Variables using Reduced Form Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using reduced form of specifications to present the causal effect of
the lift in embargo on corporate performance measures. The outcome variables are corporate cash holdings and performance measures
including the profit margin, return on equity and sales growth. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital
income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting
variables presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamees refugees share of population in 1975 as a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants
share of population in 1995. The variable post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero
otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates
include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cash holdings profit margin return on equity sales growth
refugees share of population*post1994 50.81∗∗ -22.1 -31.96 20.4∗
(21.26) (34.91) (29.19) (11.97)
size -.0178∗∗∗ .0245∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ 8.7e-04
(.0015) (.0052) (.0023) (.0021)
market-to-book .0191∗∗∗ -.1251∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .0405∗∗∗
(9.9e-04) (.015) (.0035) (.0035)
cash flow .0495∗∗∗ 2.669∗∗∗ .2588∗∗∗ .2064∗∗∗
(.0025) (.0706) (.0325) (.0149)
per capital income of state 8.5e-06∗∗∗ -4.6e-05∗∗∗ -1.5e-05∗∗∗ -9.2e-07
(2.6e-06) (7.4e-06) (4.2e-06) (2.6e-06)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.183 0.284 0.018 0.051
N 115675 114651 115659 115675
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Falsification Test using 1991 as a Placebo Year
This table presents the results of falsification, difference-in-differences approach using the reduced form of specifications to present the
causal effect of the lift in embargo on corporate investment policies. The outcome variables are corporate investment decisions including
the capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, acquisition expenditures and total investment. I control for the size, market-to-book
and cash flow and state per capital income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The
definition of all financial accounting variables presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975 a
proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995. The variable post1991 is an indicator variable with value of one for
the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population and post1991 is the coefficient
of the interest. All estimates include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3)
capital expenditures R&D expenditures total investment
refugees share of population*post1991 .3014 .7264 -.2366
(1.938) (2.859) (5.084)
size .0026∗∗∗ -.0032∗∗∗ .0032∗∗∗
(6.2e-04) (6.9e-04) (.0011)
market-to-book .0037∗∗∗ .0116∗∗∗ .0149∗∗∗
(6.9e-04) (8.5e-04) (.0011)
cash flow .0079∗∗ -.1545∗∗∗ -.1588∗∗∗
(.0037) (.0168) (.0186)
per capital income of state 3.1e-06 2.2e-06 6.2e-06
(2.0e-06) (3.2e-06) (4.5e-06)
year fixed effect yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes
R2 0.051 0.430 0.314
N 26342 13740 13250
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Test the Parallel Trend Assumption
This table presents the robustness test to check the parallel-trend assumption. I consider the growth of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures
and total investment as an outcome variable. I separate the states into two groups, the states with high number of Vietnamese refugees (more then
85 percentile) and the states with low number of Vietnamese refugees (less than 15 percentile). I compare the mean of groups prior to the lift of
trade embargo of 1994. The mean t-test provides insignificant results showing that the mean of two distributions are not statistically different from
eachother. I also compare the median of the distribution between the two groups of states. The Wilcoxon test shows no significant results meaning
that the median of the two groups are not statistically different. This table shows the distributions of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures and
total investment are the same between treatment and control group prior to the lift of the trade embargo in 1994.*, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and thep-value appears in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean t-test median Wilcoxon test
(p-value) (p-value)
Panel A. Capital Expenditures
capital expenditures growth in the states with low Vietnamese refugees ratio .679 0.664 -0.04 0.001
capital expenditures growth in the states with high Vietnamese refugees ratio .496 (0.506) -0.02 (0.999)
Panel B. R&D Expenditures
R&D expenditures growth in the states with low Vietnamese refugees ratio .254 0.117 0.02 0.070
R&D expenditures growth in the states with high Vietnamese refugees ratio .232 (0.906) -0.01 (0.944)
Panel C. Total Investment
total investment growth in the states with low Vietnamese refugees ratio .654 0.590 0.00 -0.100
total investment growth in the states with high Vietnamese refugees ratio .321 (0.555) -0.03 (0.920)
Panel D. Cash Holdings
cash holdings growth in the states with low Vietnamese refugees ratio 1.770 0.1008 -0.05 0.343
cash holdings growth in the states with high Vietnamese refugees ratio 1.679 (0.919) -0.08 (0.731)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Investment Policies as Dependent Variables using OLS Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using the OLS form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift in
embargo on corporate investment policies. The outcome variables are corporate investment decisions including the capital expenditures, R&D
expenditures, acquisition expenditures and total investment. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital income in
all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting variables presented in
Table 1. I consider the Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975 a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995. The
variable post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. The interaction term between refugees
share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
capital expenditures R&D expenditures acquisitions expenditures total investment
vietnamese share of population*post1994 -.0011∗ .0029∗∗ -1.4e-04 .0022∗∗
(5.4e-04) (.0012) (2.5e-04) (.001)
size .0023∗∗∗ -.0055∗∗∗ .0033∗∗∗ 9.9e-04
(3.9e-04) (5.5e-04) (1.7e-04) (6.7e-04)
market-to-book .0017∗∗∗ .0082∗∗∗ -8.8e-05 .0096∗∗∗
(3.3e-04) (7.1e-04) (1.1e-04) (8.3e-04)
cash flow -.0024 -.1423∗∗∗ 7.3e-04 -.1502∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0106) (6.9e-04) (.0117)
per capital income of state -1.6e-06∗∗∗ 1.8e-06∗ 2.6e-07∗ 2.8e-06∗∗∗
(1.8e-07) (1.0e-06) (1.5e-07) (9.2e-07)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.069 0.413 0.034 0.312
N 115675 63573 109871 61020
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Financing Decisions and Capital Structure as Dependent Variables using OLS Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using OLS form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift in
embargo on financing decisions and capital structure. The outcome variables are financing decisions such as net debt financing and net equity
issuance. Also, the short-term and long-term leverage choices are included as dependent variables. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash
flow and state per capital income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial
accounting variables presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamees refugees share of population in 1975 as an instrument for the Vietnamese
immigrants share of population in 1995. The variable Post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero
otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year
and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
net debt financing net equity issuance short-term leverage long-term leverage
vietnamese share of population*post1994 -9.6e-04 .0015∗∗ -6.4e-04 -.0012
(8.3e-04) (5.9e-04) (.0013) (.0018)
size .0043∗∗∗ -.0091∗∗∗ -.0082∗∗∗ .0258∗∗∗
(4.2e-04) (5.3e-04) (7.0e-04) (.0013)
market-to-book .0044∗∗∗ .0231∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ -.0058∗∗∗
(3.9e-04) (8.0e-04) (4.7e-04) (.001)
cash flow -.0736∗∗∗ -.0818∗∗∗ -.1435∗∗∗ -.0914∗∗∗
(.0035) (.0039) (.0058) (.0044)
per capital income of state -8.9e-07 8.6e-08 -8.4e-07 -1.7e-06∗
(1.2e-06) (6.7e-07) (7.3e-07) (9.1e-07)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.072 0.233 0.210 0.098
N 58509 106067 115549 115490
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Performance Measures as Dependent Variables using OLS Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using OLS form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift in
embargo on corporate performance measures. The outcome variables are corporate cash holdings and performance measures including the profit
margin, return on equity and sales growth. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital income in all the regressions.
The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting variables presented in Table 1. I consider
the Vietnamees refugees share of population in 1975 as a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995. The variable post1994
is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population
and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cash holdings profit margin return on equity sales growth
vietnamese share of population*post1994 .0067 -.0073 -.0139∗∗ .0025
(.0042) (.0098) (.0052) (.0029)
size -.0178∗∗∗ .0244∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ 8.8e-04
(.0015) (.0052) (.0023) (.0021)
market-to-book .0191∗∗∗ -.1251∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .0405∗∗∗
(1.0e-03) (.015) (.0035) (.0035)
cash flow .0492∗∗∗ 2.669∗∗∗ .2591∗∗∗ .2063∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0705) (.0324) (.0149)
per capital income of state 7.6e-06∗∗∗ -4.6e-05∗∗∗ -1.6e-05∗∗∗ -1.3e-06
(2.4e-06) (7.7e-06) (3.7e-06) (2.7e-06)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.181 0.284 0.018 0.051
N 115675 114651 115659 115675
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.12: First Stage of 2SLS Specifications
This table presents the result of the first stage of the 2SLS specifications to present the causal effect
of the lift in embargo on corporate investment policies. The outcome variable is the Vietnamese share
of population in 1995. I control for the state per capital income in the regression. I consider the
Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975 as an instrument for the Vietnamese immigrants
share of population in 1995. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, and the standard error appears in parentheses.
vietnamese share of population in 1995
b/se magnitude
refugees share of population in 1975 2161.9501∗∗∗ 0.4427
(124.4974)
per capital income of state -3.1e-05∗∗∗ -.1116
(7.2e-06)
constant 2.27∗∗∗
(.1863)
R2 0.207
N 1224
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Investment Policies as Dependent Variables using 2SLS Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using the 2SLS form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift
in embargo on corporate investment policies. The outcome variables are corporate investment decisions including the capital expenditures, R&D
expenditures, acquisition expenditures and total investment. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital income in
all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting variables presented in
Table 1. I consider the Vietnamese refugees share of population in 1975 a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants share of population in 1995. The
variable post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero otherwise. The interaction term between refugees
share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
capital expenditures R&D expenditures acquisitions expenditures total investment
predicted vietnamese share of population*post1994 -.0035∗∗∗ .0054∗∗ -3.9e-04 .0035
(8.8e-04) (.0027) (6.8e-04) (.0022)
size .0024∗∗∗ -.0056∗∗∗ .0033∗∗∗ 9.8e-04
(3.9e-04) (5.5e-04) (1.7e-04) (6.7e-04)
market-to-book .0017∗∗∗ .0082∗∗∗ -8.8e-05 .0096∗∗∗
(3.3e-04) (7.1e-04) (1.1e-04) (8.3e-04)
cash flow -.0025 -.1422∗∗∗ 7.3e-04 -.1502∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0105) (6.9e-04) (.0117)
per capital income of state -1.4e-06∗∗∗ 2.1e-06∗∗ 2.4e-07 3.0e-06∗∗∗
(1.8e-07) (1.0e-06) (1.6e-07) (9.1e-07)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.070 0.413 0.034 0.312
N 115675 63573 109871 61020
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.14: Financing Decisions and Capital Structure as Dependent Variables using 2SLS Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using 2SLS form of specifications to present the causal effect of the lift in
embargo on financing decisions and capital structure. The outcome variables are financing decisions such as net debt financing and net equity
issuance. Also, the short-term and long-term leverage choices are included as dependent variables. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash
flow and state per capital income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial
accounting variables presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamees refugees share of population in 1975 as an instrument for the Vietnamese
immigrants share of population in 1995. The variable Post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero
otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates include year
and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
net debt financing net equity issuance short-term leverage long-term leverage
predicted vietnamese share of population*post1994 -3.9e-04 .0037∗∗ -.0045 -.009∗∗
(.0019) (.0014) (.0027) (.0039)
size .0043∗∗∗ -.0091∗∗∗ -.0082∗∗∗ .0258∗∗∗
(4.2e-04) (5.3e-04) (6.9e-04) (.0013)
market-to-book .0044∗∗∗ .0231∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ -.0058∗∗∗
(3.9e-04) (8.0e-04) (4.7e-04) (.001)
cash flow -.0736∗∗∗ -.0818∗∗∗ -.1436∗∗∗ -.0915∗∗∗
(.0035) (.0039) (.0058) (.0044)
per capital income of state -7.6e-07 2.9e-07 -1.3e-06 -2.7e-06∗∗∗
(1.2e-06) (6.5e-07) (8.0e-07) (9.2e-07)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.072 0.233 0.210 0.099
N 58509 106067 115549 115490
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.15: Performance Measures as Dependent Variables using 2SLS Specifications
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences approach using 2SLS form of specifications to present the causal effect of
the lift in embargo on corporate performance measures. The outcome variables are corporate cash holdings and performance measures
including the profit margin, return on equity and sales growth. I control for the size, market-to-book and cash flow and state per capital
income in all the regressions. The sample includes firms observation between 1982 to 2005. The definition of all financial accounting
variables presented in Table 1. I consider the Vietnamees refugees share of population in 1975 as a proxy for the Vietnamese immigrants
share of population in 1995. The variable post1994 is an indicator variable with value of one for the year 1994 and after and zero
otherwise. The interaction term between refugees share of population and post1994 is the coefficient of the interest. All estimates
include year and state fixed effects. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering within state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cash holdings profit margin return on equity sales growth
predicted vietnamese share of population*post1994 .0222∗∗ -.0091 -.0149 .0095∗
(.0103) (.0164) (.0134) (.0054)
size -.0178∗∗∗ .0245∗∗∗ .036∗∗∗ 8.7e-04
(.0015) (.0052) (.0023) (.0021)
market-to-book .0191∗∗∗ -.1251∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .0405∗∗∗
(9.9e-04) (.015) (.0035) (.0035)
cash flow .0495∗∗∗ 2.669∗∗∗ .2587∗∗∗ .2064∗∗∗
(.0025) (.0706) (.0325) (.0149)
per capital income of state 9.4e-06∗∗∗ -4.6e-05∗∗∗ -1.5e-05∗∗∗ -4.9e-07
(2.6e-06) (7.8e-06) (4.3e-06) (2.6e-06)
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
state fixed effect yes yes yes yes
R2 0.183 0.284 0.018 0.051
N 115675 114651 115659 115675
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Asymmetric
Information on the Pricing of Equity
Issuance
I Introduction
The common stock price falls when firms issue seasoned equity (Schipper and Smith [1986]). Corporations
experience approximately 3 percent decline in the price of their shares at the announcement of a new
share issue with a further drop of 0.65 percent at the actual issue (Asquith and Mullins [1986] and Masulis
and Korwar [1986]). One of the reasons behind this observation is insiders with superior information
about the firm have an incentive to issue shares when the firm is overvalued. Consequently, outsiders
lower their evaluation of the issuing firms quality. This creates a lemon market problem in equity market.
Thus, the degree of information asymmetry between the insiders and investors create the negative price
reaction at the time of equity issuance.
In this paper, I examine the causal impact of information asymmetry on the price at the time of
seasoned equity issuance. The reduction in analyst coverage as a result of broker mergers as in Hong
and Kacperczyk [2010] increases the level of information asymmetry for the affected stocks. The merger
of analyst brokerage led to the firing of analysts because of redundancy or culture clash (Wu and Zang
[2009]). If the merging brokerage houses have two analysts covering same stocks, they would only keep
one of those analyst covering that stock after the merger. Kelly and Ljungqvist [2012] show an increase
in information asymmetry leads to a fall in share prices at the time of brokerage merger and a reduction
in uninformed investors’ demand for risky assets. In this paper, I investigate stock price at the date
of the seasoned equity issuance for stocks which lost their analyst coverage as a result of the brokerage
merging event. The hypothesis is stocks affected by the reduction of analyst coverage as a result of
merging brokerage may experience higher or lower reduction in price at the time of seasoned equity
issuance relative to the control group of stocks.
To test this hypothesis, I use common stocks covered by both merging houses before the merger as
the treatment group conditional on issuing equity at least once before and after the merger. I measure
the change in analyst coverage for the stocks in the treatment sample from one year before the merger
to one year after relative to a control group of stocks using a difference-in-differences approach. The
control group is stocks that issued equity and have been covered by either of the merging brokers and
not being affected by the merger event. I identify fifteen mergers of brokerage houses between 1980 to
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2005 that affected 948 stocks (stocks covered by both merging houses before the merger). To mitigate
concerns over the endogenous choice of equity issuance of each firm, I examine the differences between
the treated and control group of stocks regarding the amount of equity issuance prior to the merging
event. There is no significant differences between treated and control group regarding equity issuance
prior to the merger.
To show the causal impact of information asymmetry on price at the time of the equity issuance
is a challenging task. Suppose using the stock’s bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry,
then the coefficient of a simple regression of cumulative abnormal return in a close window during the
time of equity issuance on the bid-ask spread is biased for two reasons. First, unobserved investment
opportunity of the firm affects both bid-ask spreads as well as investors reaction at the time of equity
issuance. Secondly, low investors demand may raise stock bid-ask spread. I use an exogenous source
variation in the level of information asymmetry to overcome omitted variable and reverse causality
problems. The reduction in analyst coverage as a result of brokers merger affects the price at the time
of equity issuance through changing the degree of information asymmetry. The identification strategy
requires that losing analyst coverage increases information asymmetry but do not correlate with investors
demand. I measure the change in cumulative abnormal return in affected equity issuing firms relative to
the control group of stocks before and after the time of broker merger using a difference-in-differences
approach.
The results show that the cumulative abnormal return at the time of equity issuance is higher for
stocks which lost their analyst coverage relative to the control group. While there is no difference between
affected stocks and control group regarding equity issuance before the merger event. The average of
cumulative abnormal returns is .2 percentage and for treated stocks is by 1.1 percentage on average
higher relative to the control group of stocks considering four days window around the time of equity
issuance. The reduction in the number of analysts increases the information asymmetry for the treated
group of stocks which lost their coverage. The reduction in analyst coverage for stocks covered by both
merging houses before the merger is an exogenous source of variation in analyst coverage. Stocks who
lost their analyst coverage issue higher amount of equity after the merger event relative to the control
group of stocks. The reason can be attributed to the fact that they issue more equity after losing analyst
coverage to make the market informed. It is plausible that these stocks are undervalued, so investors
reaction to equity issuance is positive.
This paper is related to the analyst literature using broker merger as a natural experiment. In
the context of analyst earnings forecasts, (Hong and Kacperczyk [2010]) find evidence consistent with
competition reducing bias. They show that the affected stocks have lower analyst coverage and experience
an increase in optimism bias after the merger relative to a control group of firms. Using broker closures,
(Kelly and Ljungqvist [2012]) show that prices and uninformed demand fall as asymmetry increases.
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Regarding the real impacts of a reduction in analyst coverage, firms that lose an analyst decrease their
investment and financing because of an increase in the cost of capital (Derrien and KecskS [2013]). Losing
analysts coverage causes a deterioration in financial reporting quality (Irani and Oesch [2013]). Analyst
coverage is also critical for corporate governance. Therefore, CEO receives higher excess compensation;
managers make more value-destroying acquisitions after losing analysts coverage (Chen et al. [2015]).
This paper sheds light on the causal impact of losing analyst coverage on price at the time of equity
issuance.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data, construction of the main outcome variables.
Section 3 provides the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 provides an
overall picture of paper and concludes.
II Data
The primary data source of security analysts is the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers Estimate
System IBES database. The sample covers the period 19802005. The data on U.S. firms come from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT. From the CRSP, I obtain monthly
closing stock prices, monthly shares outstanding, volume and daily stock returns for NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks over the period 19802005. I use four days window around the time of equity issuance
to create the cumulative abnormal return. I obtain annual data on corporate earnings, the book value
of equity, and book value of assets during the same period from COMPUSTAT. I follow other studies
in focusing on companies’ ordinary shares, which is companies with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. To
identify the relevant mergers, I start by selecting mergers in Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers
and Acquisitions database involving financial institutions (firms with standard industrial classification
(SIC) code 6211, commodity investment firms, dealers, and exchanges). I retain mergers where there
is coverage in IBES for both the bidder and the target. I require that both merging brokerages have
overlapping coverage. In other words, I include analysts covering at least two of the same stocks. I
identify 14 brokers’ mergers between 1984 to 2005.
To examine the effect mergers on cumulative abnormal return around equity issuance, I proceed as
follows. First, I locate the IBES identifiers of the merging houses and the merged entity. Using these
identifiers, I extract the lists of stocks covered by overlapping brokers for which an earning forecast was
issued in the year before the merger. I consider the number of stocks covered by analysts at the acquirer
brokerage house and the ones covered by target house analysts. The intersection of these two lists is
the set of stocks covered by both houses in the year before the merger date. Table 3.1 shows the details
of the 14 merger events following (Irani and Oesch [2013]) paper and the number of stocks covered by
each broker and the overlapping stocks one year before the merger. I provide the names and IBES
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identification numbers of the merging brokerage houses, listing the acquirer house in the top row and
the target brokerage house in the bottom row of each merger. I report the number of stocks covered by
each brokerage houses in the year before the merger and the number of stocks covered by both brokerage
houses as well. In the last column, I provide the number of overlapping stocks that continued to be
covered by brokerage houses till one year after the merger. I also collect the data from SDC Platinum,
new issues database between 1984 to 2005. The common stocks between merging brokers that issue
equity at least once before and after the merger event are classified as the treatment group.
III Empirical Strategy
In this section, I test the hypothesis that the price reduction following the equity issuance is an increasing
function of information asymmetry. Share price at the time of equity issuance reduced more for affected
stocks which lost their analyst coverage relative to the control group of stocks. Therefore, the hypothesis
is cumulative abnormal return around the time of equity issuance is negative for stocks affected by
brokerage merger. To test this hypothesis, I employ an event study around the date of equity issuance.
I consider the overlapping stocks between target and acquirer brokers one year prior to the merger date
who issued equity at least once before and after the merger as the treatment group. I identify 2488
number of stocks in the overlapping group. I consider only stocks that lost analyst coverage as a result of
brokers merger and include only those that issue equity, at least, one time before and one time after the
merger. I create the cumulative abnormal return with four days window around equity issuance date.
The SDC data including the issuance equity information has 6010 observations between 1984 to 2005.
I find the treated stocks with at least one-time equity issuance before and one time after the merge in
this sample. I end up with 1232 number of firm date observations as treated group.
In equation 3.1, the outcome variable is cumulative abnormal return, CARit constructed within
the four days window around the equity issuance date. I employ a difference-in-differences approach
to identify the asymmetric information channel of pricing at the time of equity issuance. The variable
Post Mergerit has value of one if the date of equity issuance is after the merger event and zero otherwise.
Treatmenti is an indicator variable with the value of one for the overlapping stocks lose the analyst
coverage one year before the merger who issued equity at least once both before and after the merger
and zero otherwise. The β3 is the coefficient of interest showing the effect of treatment after the merger
period. I control for stock and year fixed effects in the estimation. According to the hypothesis, the sign
for β3 may be positive or negative. Thus, the cumulative abnormal return is can be higher or lower for
treated stocks which lost their analyst coverage relative to the control group of stocks. In other words,
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the change in information asymmetry affects the investors’ reaction at the time of equity issuance.
CARit = αi + γt + β3Post Mergerit ∗ Treatmenti + εit (3.1)
According to the adverse selection theory of Myers and Majluf [1984] on equity issuance, the share
price is lower at the time of equity issuance, and information asymmetry explains the reason behind
this. Overvalued stocks would issue equity before the market is fully informed and investors consider the
lemon equity market and have an adverse reaction. This paper does not discuss how share price reacts
to the change in the level of information asymmetry. The post-merger time refers to high information
asymmetry period which is the time when treated stocks lose their analyst coverage. In other words,
the price as a reaction to equity issuance can be higher or lower when the information asymmetry is
high comparing to the time when the information asymmetry is weak. This depends on whether stocks
are overvalued or undervalued before the equity issuance. To address concerns over endogenous equity
issuance choices. I use the amount of equity issuance for each stock at the different time, Equityit, as
an alternative outcome variable, there must be no difference between treated and control stocks before
the merger.
IV Results
This section shows the main results of the paper. First, I use the cumulative abnormal return around
the time of equity issuance as an outcome variable. I examine investors reaction for stocks which lost
analyst coverage after the merger event. Then, I investigate the equity issuance behavior of affected
stocks. Finally, I discuss the number of analysts before and after the merger event.
Table 3.2 shows the main results of this paper. I create the cumulative abnormal return using different
window around the time of equity issuance. I use four days window before the equity issuance till four
days after the time of issuance. Therefore, I consider windows of (-4,-1), (-4,+1), (-1,+4) and (-4,-4)
in creating the cumulative abnormal return. The results show that stocks which lost analyst coverage
have higher cumulative abnormal return relative to the control group of stocks after the merger event.
These results are consistent using different windows around the time of equity issuance. The average
of cumulative abnormal returns is .2 percentage and for treated stocks is by 1.1 percentage on average
higher relative to the control group of stocks considering four days window around the time of equity
issuance.
Table 3.3 shows the results of using the amount of equity issuance as an outcome variable. First,
there is no significant differences between treated stocks and control group before the merger event.
This mitigates concerns over the endogenous equity issuance choices. Second, stocks which lost analyst
coverage issue more equity relative to the control group of stocks after the merger event. The reason can
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be related to the fact that stocks with higher information asymmetry are more inclined to issue equity in
order to get the market informed. Stocks which lost analyst coverage issue equity more than the control
group after the merger event by .32 of one standard deviation.
Table 3.4 shows the results of using the number of analysts as an outcome variable. There is significant
differences between treated stocks and control group before the merger event. The difference is not large
and only two analysts. Therefore, the initial amount of analyst coverage does not determine the results
of the share price. The number of analysts for treated stocks decreases after the merger event relative
to the control group of stocks. This shows the merger event cause reduction in analyst coverage for the
group of stocks affected by the merger event.
V Conclusion
I examine the importance of information asymmetry channel in pricing the equity issues by using a
natural experiment. I find an increase in share price at the time of equity issuance after the merger date
for the stocks which lost their analyst coverage. Adverse selection theory emphasizes the asymmetric
information as an explanation for the price drop after the equity issuance. The reason behind this
argument is, firms issue equities when they are overvalued, and the share price declines at the time of
equity issuance when the level of asymmetric information is higher. The results show that the price
at the issuance equity announcement increases in the degree of information asymmetry. I employ a
shock to asymmetric information following brokerage mergers which was unexpected to the firms. The
mergers lead to a reduction in analyst coverage on the stocks that were covered by both the acquirer
and target firms premerger. If a stock is covered by both firms before the merger, they will get rid of
at least one the analysts usually the target analyst. The price reaction at the time of equity issuance is
potentially explained by information asymmetry. Therefore, I expect to find evidence for the asymmetric
information channel for the price drop after the equity issuance.
In this paper, I establish the empirical evidence for the existence of asymmetric information in the
equity market. To do so, I exploit an identification strategy that allows me to use the exogenous source of
variation in analyst coverage to examine the impact of information asymmetry on cumulative abnormal
return around the time of equity issuance. Here, I exploit the natural experiment in a sense that the
number of sell-side analysts who cover a stock reduced as a result of brokerage mergers. The 14 brokerage
firms in the United States merge between 1984 to 2005 leading to a total of 2488 coverage terminations.
Brokerage merger is an exogenous source of variation in the extent of analyst coverage, and this change
helps me to identify the channel in which equity issuance lowers the stock prices. Following the exogenous
coverage terminations, information asymmetry increases while the share prices of equity issues are higher
for stocks which lost analyst coverage comparing to the control group of stocks. There is not significant
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differences regarding the amount of equity issuance before the merger event. However, stocks which lost
analyst coverage issue more equity after the merger event relative to the control group.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Mergers. This Table reports details of the merger events. The name and
dates of the merging brokerage houses are included. For each merger, the brokerage house in the top row is the
acquirer and the brokerage house in the bottom row is the target similar to Irani and Oesch [2013]. The table
shows the number of stocks covered by each merging brokerage house one year prior to the merger and also the
overlapping stocks covered by both brokerage houses. The overlap retained stocks are the overlapping stocks
continued to be covered by the merging brokerage till one year after the merger.
Merger Brokerage IBES Merger Stock Overlap Overlap
Number House Identifier Date Coverage Stocks Retained
1 Wheat First Securities Inc(WF) 282 10/31/1988 243 17 15
Butcher and Co., Inc. 44 91 5
2 PainWebber Group, Inc. 189 12/31/1994 460 324 274
Kidder Peabody and Co. 150 356 0
3 Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. 192 05/31/1997 695 353 318
Dean Witter Discover and Co. 232 199 0
4 Smith Barney 254 11/28/1997 808 532 457
Salomon Brothers 242 405 19
5 Everen Capital Corp. 829 01/09/1998 253 19 2
Principal Financial Securities 495 160 0
6 DA Davidson and Co. 79 02/17/1998 80 24 22
Jensen Securities Co. 932 49 4
7 Dain Rauscher Corp. 76 04/06/1998 443 66 47
Wessels Arnold and Henderson LLC 280 109 21
8 First Union Corp., NC 282 10/01/1999 370 40 33
Everen Capital Corp. 829 232 0
9 Pain Webber Group, Inc. 189 06/12/2000 723 35 22
JC Bradford and Co. 34 180 0
10 CSFB 100 10/15/2000 688 566 487
Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette 86 462 0
11 UBS Warburg Dillon Read 85 12/10/2000 479 376 329
Paine Webber 189 339 0
12 Chase Manhattan 125 12/31/2000 486 114 2
JP Morgan 873 595 99
13 Fahnestock and Co. 98 09/18/2001 125 12 1
Josephthal Lyon and Ross 933 144 12
14 Janney Montgomery Scott LLC 142 03/22/2005 140 10 9
Parker/Hunter Inc. 860 54 5
Total 9368 2488
70
Table 3.2: This table shows the main results of the regression. The dependent variable is the
cumulative abnormal return around the time of the equity issuance using different time window.
Column (1) shows the time window of four days before till the day before equity issuance. Treated
firms is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm lost its analyst coverage
through brokerage merger and issued equity at least once before and after the merger event. Post
is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one for periods after the merger and a value of
zero otherwise. The variable Treated*Post Merger is an interaction term of treated stocks and post
merger. Including year and stock fixed effects are specified in each estimation. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
and the standard error appears in parentheses.
CAR CAR CAR CAR
Window (-4,-1) (-4,+1) (-1,+4) (-4,+4)
Treated*Post Merger 0.0079** 0.0081** 0.0081** 0.0110**
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0049)
ysd 0.0615 0.0777 0.0783 0.0946
ymean .0029 -.0064 -.0026 .0022
ar2 .1278 .1437 .1481 .1667
N 3940 3940 3940 3940
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
stock fixed effect yes yes yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: This table shows the main results of the regression. The dependent variable is the amount of equity
issuance. Column (1) shows the amount of equity issuance before the merger event. Column (2) shows the
amount of equity issuance in general. Treated firms is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one if
the firm lost its analyst coverage through brokerage merger and issued equity at least once before and after the
merger event. Post is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one for periods after the merger and a value
of zero otherwise. The variable Treated*Post Merger is an interaction term of treated stocks and post merger.
Including year and stock fixed effects are specified in each estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and the standard error appears
in parentheses.
Equity Amount Before Merger Event Equity Amount
Treated 0.0087
(0.0148)
Treated*Post Merger .14***
(.0206)
ysd 0.3375 0.4497
ymean .1808 .2471
ar2 .5137 .3488
N 1954 3940
year fixed effect yes yes
stock fixed effect yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: This table shows the main results of the regression. The dependent variable is the number of analysts.
Column (1) shows the number of analysts before the merger event. Column (2) shows the number of analysts in
general. Treated firms is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm lost its analyst coverage
through brokerage merger and issued equity at least once before and after the merger event. Post is an indicator
variable that is assigned a value of one for periods after the merger and a value of zero otherwise. The variable
Treated*Post Merger is an interaction term of treated stocks and post merger. Including year and stock fixed
effects are specified in each estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and the standard error appears in parentheses.
Number of Analysts Before the Merger Event Number of Analysts
Treated 2.1099*** 2.3805***
(0.1222) (0.1146)
Treated*Post Merger -.5812***
(.1537)
ysd 2.4776 2.5008
ymean 4.843 4.529
ar2
N 1954 3940
year fixed effect yes yes
stock fixed effect no yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Chapter 4
The Role of Ownership in Privately
Held Firms: Evidence from the
Financial Crisis
I Introduction
The reason family-owned firms exist and the efficiency of resource allocation by family firms are im-
portant research subjects to financial economists. Theories of family-owned firms offer some predictions
concerning the composition and characteristics of these firms. To date, empirical studies examining
these predictions focus exclusively on their validity in the context of publicly traded firms, perhaps due
to limitations on the availability of data on private firms. Indeed, some fundamental questions concern-
ing private firms remain unanswered. As a result, not much information is known about the ownership
structure of privately held firms and their performance.
This paper addresses this gap in the empirical literature by analyzing the role of family-owned firms
in improving the productivity of private firms using a unique data covering the universe of private firms
in all sectors of the U.S. economy. Using a hand-collected data from a restricted database named, Privco,
I empirically examine the causal impact of the liquidity shortage of the recent financial crisis on the U.S.
private firms. I distinguish between private firms owned by families versus the ones backed by venture
capital or private equity. I investigate the differences in revenue and employment of privately held firms
considering their ownership structure. The hypothesis is family-owned firms have higher revenue growth
relative to nonfamily-owned firms. The reason can be attributed to the fact that families rely less on an
external source of financing from venture capital and private equity.
I find economically substantial differences in the revenue growth and employment growth of privately
held firms with the classification of family and nonfamily-owned structure. The results show family-
owned firms have higher revenue and employment growth relative to nonfamily-owned firms after the
2008 financial crisis. The changes in the revenue growth are the same between family and nonfamily firms
before the recent financial crisis, and the differences between these two groups emerge just at the time of
the crisis. Moreover, using the year 2006 as a placebo test, there are no differences between family and
non-family firms. Regarding the economic magnitude, family-owned firms increase their revenue growth
by .45 and employment growth by .49 of one standard deviation from the mean, respectively.
The vast majority of the U.S. firms are private while there exist a few pieces of research on them.
According to the Census data, only 0.08 percent of the U.S. firms (4584 numbers) are public, and the rest
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of the U.S. firms are privately held. Our understanding of family firms is based on the only evidence that
we have from public firms while the most of the family-owned businesses are privately held. This paper
examines the performance of the privately owned firms regarding their ownership structure, using a new
dataset of private U.S. firms covering 10032 firms and 140448 firm-year observations over the period
2000-2013. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first research on privately-held firms in U.S.
measuring the differences in performance of privately-held firms regarding their ownership. Moreover,
this is the only research using Privco dataset for the first time.
Our knowledge on the performance of the firms in the U.S. is restricted to the stock market listed
firms. Some of the recent papers try to explore the field of private firms and document the differences
between private and public firms regarding the investment, payout policy, innovation and amount of cash
holdings. Asker et al. [2011] show that public firms invest myopically and less than private firms. The
paper uses the Sageworks Inc. database created with incorporation with hundreds of accounting firms
and biased towards large private firms. Accounting firms input the data of their unlisted corporate clients
into Sageworks database which raises the selection bias concerns. Moreover, the firms in the Sageworks
database are anonymous, and their ownership structure is not identifiable.
Many papers aim to compare public firms with private ones. Chemmanur et al. [2011] show the total
factor productivity of venture capital backed firms is higher than non-venture-capital backed private
firms in manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy. Asker et al. [2011] shows private firms have a lower
level of cash than public firms since private firm do not have to pay for the disclosure cost. In contrast,
Asker et al. [2011]show that stock market listed firms invest less and are less responsive to changes in
investment opportunities than private firms. Michaely and Roberts [2012] show private firms in UK
smooth dividend less than public firms. Bayar and Chemmanur [2012] show private firms choose to be
acquired rather than to go public at higher valuations. Using the data of IPO withdraws; Bernstein
[2015] examines the effect of going public on innovation and show the quality of internal innovation of
public firms declines relative to firms that remained private.
To evaluate the performance of private firms, comparing the behavior of private firms simply with
the public firms is problematic. First, private firms are maybe more financially constrained than public
firms since they do not have any access to the stock market. Having access to the stock market provides
low cost of capital. Therefore, the private and public firms are not readily comparable since they are
different in nature regarding access to the capital and investment opportunities. Second, the separation
of ownership and control in public firms may lead to agency problems if the interest of manager is
different from the investors. While the conflict between manager and shareholder or shareholder and
creditors is lower in family firms (Anderson and Reeb [2003] and Villalonga and Amit [2006]). Moreover,
the possibility of Wall Street Walk by the shareholders in which enables them to sell their stock rather
than monitoring management. This possibility weakens the corporate governance in public firms (Bhide
75
[1993]). This type of agency problem does not exist in private firms, and the owners monitor the manager
more carefully. Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) in 2003 shows 94.1 percent of the large private
firms have fewer than ten shareholders. The existence of the conflict between manager and shareholders
exist in public firms than among private ones.
Less separation of ownership and control which is typical for family firms (Faccio and Lang [2002])
increases interest alignment between owners and managers (Anderson and Reeb [2003]). Moreover,
family shareholders are usually large block holders with high monitoring incentives. High-risk aversion
in family firms is a reputation concern. The reputation of the family is closely linked to the firm. Since
they face the danger of a decreased reputation, they might try to reduce firm risk to avoid bankruptcy.
Family firms are often regarded as a family asset that has to be given from one generation to the next.
It is crucial to understand that not only passing the wealth, but the family firm itself as an asset to
following generations is important. Consequently, it is necessary for the family to stay in control over
the firm. Long-term orientation is one of the most significant differences between family-owned firms
and non-family owned firms. While other types of shareholders are often focused on capital gains in the
short run, family firms have a longer investment horizon.
Firms with a longer investment horizon show less managerial myopia and are less likely to maximize
short-term earnings at the cost of long-term success (Stein [1989]). Family firms prefer investing in
physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects relative to nonfamily firms (Anderson et al. [2012]).
Furthermore, the fact that families often play a significant role in the firm over several generations may
increase the reputation of the firm. The reputation of the firm causes the family firms to pay lower interest
rates on their debt compared to non-family firms. On the other hand, there are arguments against a
superior performance of family firms. First, the conflict between majority and minority shareholders
may be more pronounced if there exists a substantial shareholder. This large shareholder often has
incentives to extract private benefits of control, at the cost of small minority shareholders. Family firms
may suffer from the fact that their managers are often chosen from a small pool of candidates, namely
family members. Therefore, relativeness to the family and not the managerial talent is used as criteria
for the selection, leading to an ineffective choice of managers (Prez-Gonzlez [2006]).
Family ownership is endogenous in both public and private firms. Evidence from the European
countries shows that in countries with high investor protection, well-developed financial markets, family
firms is concentrated in industries in which low investment opportunities, low M&A activities, and new
equity issues are prevalent. In countries that have weak investor protection, family controls in industry
are unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A. Most studies on family ownership have exclusively
focused on listed firms. Exceptions are Bloom and van Reenen [2007], who study management practices
in private manufacturing firms in the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Also,
Almeida et al. [2011], who analyze ultimate ownership for both private and listed firms in Korean chaebol
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groups and Almeida et al. [2015] shows chaebol firms invest signicantly more than non-chaebol firms in
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis.
This paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, I find economically substantial differences
in the performance of privately held firms. Since only private firms with at least 500 shareholder and
10 million dollars assets have an obligation to disclose their financials and file with SEC, little is known
about how private firms operate and the existing literature on private firms is biased to only large private
firms. Second, I examine the structure of private firms regarding family and non-family ownership which
was not documented in previous literature. In contrast to the literature on VC-backed firms, I find that
family-owned firms have higher revenue although they do not have any access to private financings such
as VC, or private equity-backed firms. Third, all of our knowledge about the financial crisis is of its
effect on the public firms, and nothing is known about the consequences of the recent liquidity shortage
on private firms which are the large, vulnerable sector of the U.S. economy. Fourth, this is the first time
in the literature that this new database is utilized, and no other single paper or article have previously
analyzed this database.
Using a hand-collected data from a restricted database named, Privco, I document the differences
in the performance of the privately held firms regarding their ownership structure. PrivCo is founded
in 2009 and is the premier source for business and financial research on non-publicly traded companies,
including family-owned, private equity owned, venture backed, and international unlisted companies.
This database includes information on the ownership structure of privately held firms, whether they are
family owned or backed by private equity or venture capitals also on the year of foundation, the amount
of revenue and number of employees per years. The data includes US private firms, and there exist
1111 number of family firms and 8921 number of non-family ones which are backed by private equity or
venture capitals. The sample includes 13909 firm-year observations.
To measure the differences in the performance of family and non-family firms, I use the recent
financial crisis in the United States as a quasi-natural experiment.The 2007 financial crisis was a truly
unprecedented and a large scale unexpected event that significantly affected the US economy. The crisis
made it challenging and costly for the firms to raise external capital such as bank loans and bonds. The
private equities and venture capital backed firms (non-family firms) depend on private financing more
than the family owned businesses, therefore, more affected by the liquidity shortage in the market in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. The reputation concern of the family-owned firms may lead them to use
their personal saving and wealth in response to liquidity shortage for the continuation of the business.
Moreover, their risk aversion and long-term investment horizon led them to make better investment
decisions before the crisis and help them to have a better allocation of their capital. Family firms can
keep up their revenue through making conservative investment decisions before the crisis or using their
personal wealth and not save cost by laying off their employees in the aftermath of the crisis. As a result,
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family firms are less affected by the liquidity shortage of the financial crisis and have higher revenue and
revenue growth during and in the periods of the post-crisis.
I construct fixed five years window before and after 2008 to measure the impact of the recent financial
crisis on the performance. I show family firms have higher revenue and employment growth than non-
family firms after the crisis. To capture the differences in investment opportunities for each firm, I
control for the year and firm fixed effects. This shows that family firms have a higher capability to
overcome the financial crisis comparing to non-family firms. The results are robust to conditioning on
the age of the firms, which is the difference between the current year and the founded one. This suggests
that the observed differences in performance behavior are not the result of family-owned firms being
systematically older and more mature than other types of private firms.
The paper is related to several strands in the literature. First, the research on public family-firms
documented that family firms do not outperform non-family firms in the crisis while family firms with
founder presence exceed by 18 percent relative to non-family firms Zhou [2012]. Second, this paper is
closely related to the literature on private firms and showing the difference between the private and public
firms regarding investment, the level of cash and innovation. Also, in nature, it is close to the literature
on the recent financial crisis and its consequences for the economy.The rest of this paper proceeds as
follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the data source; section 4 presents
the results of the ownership structure of privately held firms on their performance; section 6 describes
the robustness tests and section 7 provides a conclusion.
II Empirical Strategy
In this paper, I examine whether the ownership of the privately held firms affects their performance in
a stressed credit condition associated with a financial crisis. Private firms that rely more on private
financing will be affected by the higher cost of credit relative to the firms that rely more on internal
funds and personal wealth. The 2008 financial crisis mainly originated as a sudden shortage of dollar
funding on the balance sheet of banks in many developed economies (Khwaja and Mian [2008]). Bank
funding problems eventually followed by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy event in September 2008 and
then sources of financing froze across banks.
Two distinct factors contribute to tight credit conditions during recession associated with the financial
crisis. First, the 2007 financial crisis is characterized by banking sector difficulties, which include the
loss of confidence in some banks and depletion of bank capital. These serve to reduce the effectiveness
of typical financial intermediation activities. Second, the balance sheet of debtors, both households,
and firms, deteriorate significantly either through bankruptcies, falling asset prices or failed investments.
Higher borrowing costs and reduction in the availability of credit for firms and industries that are more
78
bank-dependent affect the performance of these companies following the crisis. Financial crisis was an
unexpected and a large scale exogenous shock to the investment opportunity and capital availability of
the firms. Non-family owned firms are more likely to be affected by the financial crisis since they depend
more on the private financing by private equities and venture capitals. I adopt a difference-in-differences
approach to test if the difference in the revenue of the family firms is larger in the aftermath of a financial
crisis relative to the difference in the revenue of the non-family owned firms. Since the 2007 financial crisis
was unexpected, it is highly unlikely that firms changed their structure or ownership in an anticipation
of the effects of the crisis. This argument suggests that family ownership at the time of the crisis is likely
exogenous to the post-crisis outcomes. The empirical secification is as follows:
Yit = αi + γt + β1Familyi ∗ Postt + εit (4.1)
In equation 4.1, Yit is the difference in natural logarithm of revenue of firm i and in year t (revenue
growth). I use the difference in the natural logarithm of employment as an alternative outcome variable.
Familyi is a dummy variable has the value of one if the firm is a family owned business and zero if it
is a non-family one and backed by private equity or venture capitals. Postt is a dummy variable has
the value of one in the aftermath of the financial crisis including the year 2008 and five years after till
2012 and zero otherwise. The interaction term between family firms and post-crisis is the variable of
interest which shows how family firms are affected in the aftermath of crisis. β1 is the coefficient of
interest indicating the effect of the financial crisis and type of ownership on firm’s revenue. I control for
the age of the firms in different regressions. I include the firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level to account for correlation in the firm-level errors over time. In each regression,
I consider five years window before and after the year 2008, starting from 2003 and ending to 2012.
III Data
To test the differences in the performance of the privately held firms regarding their ownership structure
as specified in equation4.1, I use the data obtained from a restricted database named, Privco, includes
the revenue and employment information of the privately held firms. The Privco company is founded
in 2009 and is the premier source for private company financial and deal information including family
owned, private equity owned, venture backed, and international unlisted companies. Privco combines
over 15000 different sources and uses proprietary technology to verify the private company financials.
To be included in this database, private companies must meet certain criteria, a minimum of $10 million
in revenue and have at least 100 employees. Private companies that satisfy this criterion but excluded
from this database are partnerships with legal licensing restrictions on ownership, which includes CPA,
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law firms, and medical practices.
This database provides the financial data for 168505 private companies and includes information on
the ownership structure of privately held firms, whether they are family owned or backed with private
equity or venture capitals also on the year of foundation, the amount of revenue and number of employees
per years. I hand collect the privately held firms located in the US from this database between 2000 till
2012. The sample includes 13909 firm-year observations in total. Table 4.1 shows the total number size
of the sample regarding family and non-family firms. There exist 10032 number of private firms in the
sample, 1111 number of family firms and 8921 number of non-family firms which are backed with private
equities or venture capitals. Table 4.2 illustrates the number of firms in each year classified as the type
of ownership. The sample is an unbalanced panel which includes firms that entered or exited the data
in the middle of the period. For example, a firm might enter the data when it has $10 million in revenue
or exit the data because it goes out of business.
There exists a selection bias problem due to the type of the data. To balance the panels artificially
by discarding firms that are not present in every period is inefficient and can introduce severe biases.
Firms that are more productive for any unobserved reasons are more likely to stay in business. Such
firms also tend to enjoy higher marginal benefits from capital, so they choose to invest in higher capital
levels. Unobserved productivity leads to omitted variables bias. When we artificially balance a panel, we
select firms that are particularly productive (and that tend to have higher capital levels). This sample
selection bias can substantially exacerbate the omitted variables bias, depending on how much entry and
exit is occurring during the period. Therefore, to eliminate the selection bias, in the sample I keep all
the corporations who has entered the sample in the year 2003 and not before that to control for the
compositional effect.
IV Main Results
To make the interpretation of the coefficients possible, I normalize the level of revenue to $10 million
and a number of employees to 1000. The summary statistics of the data appears in Table 4.3. The
summary statistics shows that family firms have higher revenue relative to non-family firms and also
they have a higher number of employees. The Privco database does not have any information about
the balance sheet and financial characteristics of the private firms. It only has the information on the
revenue, employment, geographical location, type of the industry and the ownership structure of the
privately held firms. Therefore, due to data limitation, I only use the revenue as an outcome variable
instead of using profitability and also employ the number of employees as a proxy for the size of the firm.
Table 4.4 shows the main result of the difference-in-differences specification using the difference in
natural logarithm of revenue (revenue growth) and the difference in natural logarithm of employment
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(employment growth) as outcome variables. I include both firm and year fixed effects in all estimations.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.4 shows the results of the regression using revenue growth as an out-
come variable. Using employment growth as an outcome variable, the estimation results are reported
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.4. Family firms significantly increase their revenue growth in the
aftermath of the crisis (column (1)). Family-owned firms increase their revenue growth by .45 of one
standard deviation of the mean. Controlling for firm age leads to similar results (column (2)). Moreover,
employment growth is higher for family-owned firms after the recent financial crisis. Family-owned firms
increase their employment growth by .49 of one standard deviation of the mean (column (3)). Again,
controlling for firm age generates similar behavior of family firms (column(4)).
V Robustness Tests
In this section, I present evidence to support the main results of the paper reported in the previous
section. To address the concern that higher revenue of family firms in the aftermath of the financial
crisis is not a trend effect, I formally test the parallel trend prior to the crisis between treatment and
control groups. Then, I employ a placebo test using non-crisis years to highlight the effect of financial
crisis as an shock to private firms.
A Parallel Trend Assumption Between the Family-owned and
NonFamily-owned Firms
The difference-in-differences approach depends on the parallel trend assumption that there is no sys-
tematic difference in the trend of revenue between treatment and control in the pre-treatment periods.
Here, I report a formal way to test the parallel trend assumption. To make inferences from the primary
specification, both family, and non-family firms should have followed parallel trends before the financial
crisis. If there is a pre-existing trend, such as increasing pattern in the revenue, then the differences
found in the changes in revenue among family and non-family firms cannot be ascribed to the financial
crisis. To address this concern, I examine if the effects found in the main result exist in the pre-treatment
periods. I have the information about the revenue of the privately held firms at five different years before
the financial crisis (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007) and five different years after the crisis (2008, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012). The empirical specification to test the parallel trend assumption is shown in equa-
tion 4.2. I include the interaction between family indicator and each year dummy to test the parallel
trend assumption. The hypothesis is the interactions are insignificant before the year 2008 and become
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significant afterward.
Revenueit = αi + γt + β1(Familyi ∗ Y r2003) + β2(Familyi ∗ Y r2004) + β3(Familyi ∗ Y r2005)
+β4(Familyi ∗ Y r2006) + β5(Familyi ∗ Y r2008) + β6(Familyi ∗ Y r2009)
+β7(Familyi ∗ Y r2010) + β8(Familyi ∗ Y r2011) + β9(Familyi ∗ Y r2012) + εit
(4.2)
Table 4.5 reports the regression results considering the interaction between the family firms and the
dummy variable representing each year. Using the revenue growth as an outcome variable, the coeffi-
cient estimates for namely the interactions between the treatment dummies and the five pre-experiment
periods, are not statistically significant, while those for the interaction between treatment dummies and
post-experiment period dummies are significant. This suggests that there is a parallel trend between
the family and non-family firms before the crisis, but there is a different trend between the family and
non-family firms after the financial crisis happened. In other words, there is no significant differences
between family and non-family firms regarding the revenue growth before the financial crisis and the
differences emerge just at the time of the crisis in 2008. Using the employment growth as an outcome
variable, the differences between family and non-family firms appeared in 2009.
B Evidence from the non-crisis periods: Placebo test
To verify the results of the paper, it is essential to show that the family firms do not have higher revenue
in comparison to non-family firms in the non-crisis periods. I replicate the same test similar to the one
used in the main regression and apply it to a placebo period dated three years earlier year 2005. Here,
I include the sample between 2002 to 2007. This placebo test can help rule out alternative explanations
such as unobservable firm characteristics that drive both ownership and revenue of the firms. If the
results were driven by unobservable characteristics, the same result would be found in other periods
as well. I create a dummy variable with value of one for the years 2005 and after and zero otherwise.
Table 4.6 shows the result of the placebo test. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and
insignificant showing that family firms do not have a different revenue growth after the year 2005 relative
to non-family firms. Moreover, using employment growth as an outcome variable generate similar results.
In other words, family firms have similar employment growth to non-family firms after the year 2005.
Table 4.6 shows the result of the placebo test using 2005 as a non-crisis period.
VI Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between the ownership structure of companies and their
performance by employing the recent financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment. I evaluate differences
in the performance of privately held corporations using an unexplored data source, Privco, on private
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firms in the US. I find that privately owned companies have a different performance depending on their
type of ownership. I show family owned firms outperform non-family owned firms in the aftermath of the
crisis while family firms have lower revenue in the regular periods. I employ a difference-in-differences
method to compare the revenue of family firms relative to non-family firms backed with private equities
and venture capitals in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
The financial crisis effect on non-family firms is larger than family firms since their performance
depends on the source of private financing. Having long-term investment horizon, risk aversion, conser-
vative behavior and reputation concern in family firms help them to mitigate the negative consequences
of the crisis. This paper makes four significant contributions to the literature. First, I find economically
substantial differences in the performance of privately held firms. Since only private companies with
at least 500 shareholder and 10 million dollars assets have an obligation to disclose their financials and
file with SEC, little is known about how private firms operate and the existing literature on private
companies is biased to only large private firms. Second, I examine the structure of private firms regard-
ing family and non-family ownership which was not documented in previous literature. In contrast to
the literature on VC-backed firms, I find that family-owned firms have higher revenue although they do
not have any access to private financings such as VC or private equity-backed firms. Third, all of our
knowledge about the financial crisis is of its effect on the public firms, and nothing is known about the
consequences of the recent liquidity shortage on private firms which are the large, vulnerable sector of
the US economy. Fourth, this is the first time in the literature that this new database is utilized, and
no other single paper or article have previously analyzed this database.
Family firms can keep up their revenue through making conservative investment decisions before the
crisis or using their personal wealth and not save cost by laying off their employees in the aftermath of
the crisis. As a result, family firms are less affected by the liquidity shortage of the financial crisis and
have higher revenue during and in the post-crisis periods. Overall, the results suggest the active role for
family-owned private firms in the US economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis due to the lower
agency problems and conservative behaviors.
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Table 4.1: This table reports the sample size of privately held firms in terms of
the type of ownership. The first row reports the number of non-family owned firms
backed by private equity or venture capitals, and the second row describes the number
of family owned firms. The third row reports the number of family and non-family
firms in total.
Numbers
Non-family owned 8921
Family wned 1111
Total 10032
Table 4.2: This table reports the sample size of privately held firms in each year
and in terms of the type of ownership. The first column reports the number of
non-family owned firms backed by private equity or venture capitals, and the second
column describes the number of family owned firms. The third column reports the
number of family and non-family firms in total.
Non-Family Owned Family Owned Total
2000 45 37 82
2001 85 69 154
2002 166 179 345
2003 227 227 454
2004 299 278 577
2005 510 347 857
2006 716 447 1163
2007 931 573 1504
2008 1224 797 2021
2009 1370 811 2181
2010 1467 833 2300
2011 1322 733 2055
2012 174 35 209
2013 7 0 7
Total 8543 5366 13909
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Table 4.3: This table reports the summary statistics of privately held firms in terms of the type of ownership. The first row
reports the the revenue normalized to $10 million dollars, and the fifth row reports the number of employees normalized to
1000 people. The table shows the difference between revenue and employment between family and non-family owned firms.
In the columns, the average, standard deviation,minimum, 5th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile,
95th percentile and maximum are shown.
mean sd min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max
Revenue($10 million)
non-family owned 30.49382 203.4644 -.1075156 .06 .5944 2.47 13.27 120 6581.5
family owned 117.42 585.7324 .00007 .24 2.3 14.50503 87.4 349.9423 13390
Total 64.02936 399.4496 -.1075156 .0930768 .8425 4.63 28.5 231.3422 13390
Employment(1000)
non-family owned 1358.402 2778.868 2 25 75 250 1200 6800 19800
family owned 4658.91 12182.95 1 14 130 700 3600 20000 152600
Total 4219.903 11443.75 1 15 120 583 3248 18000 152600
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Table 4.4: This table shows the main results of the regression. The dependent variable is the difference of natural logarithm of revenue of privately
held firms in the first two columns and the difference of natural logarithm of employment in the last two columns. The sample includes years between
2003 to 2012. Family-owned firms is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm is owned by family and a value of zero if it is
backed by private equity or venture capitals. Post crisis is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one for the year 2008 and after and a
value of zero otherwise. The variable Family-owned firms*post crisis is an interaction term of family-owned and post crisis variables. Age shows the
age of each firm. Including year and firm fixed effects are specified in each estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and the standard error appears in parentheses.
Difference in Ln Revenue Difference in Ln Revenue Difference in Ln Employment Difference in Ln Employment
family*post crisis 0.2043*** 0.2045*** 0.1060*** 0.0838**
(0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0320) (0.0333)
age -.056*** -.0115***
(.0042) (.0043)
ysd 0.4523 0.4536 0.2179 0.2155
ymean .2552 .2556 .0413 .0411
ar2 .5123 .5085 .246 .2409
N 1.1e+04 1.0e+04 2969 2863
year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: This table shows the results of parallel-trend assumption. The dependent variable is the difference of natural logarithm of revenue
of privately held firms in the first column and the difference of natural logarithm of employment in the second column. Family-owned firms is an
indicator variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm is owned by family and a value of zero if it is backed by private equity or venture
capitals. Intr04 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2004 dummy. Intr05 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2005
dummy. Intr06 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2006 dummy. Intr07 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2007
dummy. Intr08 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2008 dummy. Intr09 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2009
dummy. Intr10 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2010 dummy. Intr10 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2011
dummy. Intr10 is the interaction between family-owned and year 2012 dummy. Including year and firm fixed effects are specified in each estimation.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, and the standard error
appears in parentheses.
Difference in Ln Revenue Difference in Ln Employment
family-owned firms*year 2004 0.0486 0.0025
(0.0324) (0.0261)
family-owned firms*year 2005 .0585 .0948
(.0398) (.0634)
family-owned firms*year 2006 -.0133 .0577**
(.0376) (.0248)
family-owned firms*year 2007 .0558 .0162
(.0362) (.024)
family-owned firms*year 2008 .1113*** .0598
(.0352) (.0475)
family-owned firms*year 2009 .1414*** .0875**
(.0346) (.0434)
family-owned firms*year 2010 .2489*** .1965***
(.0345) (.0428)
family-owned firms*year 2011 .2798*** .2062***
(.035) (.0434)
family-owned firms*year 2012 .058 .2316***
(.0631) (.0502)
ysd 0.4523 0.2179
ymean .2552 .0413
ar2 .5056 .2528
N 1.1e+04 2969
year fixed effect yes yes
firm fixed effect yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: This table shows the results of a placebo test. The dependent variable is the difference of natural logarithm of revenue
of privately held firms in the first column and the difference of natural logarithm of employment in the second column. The sample
includes years between 2002 to 2007. Family-owned firms is an indicator variable that is assigned a value of one if the firm is owned
by family and a value of zero if it is backed by private equity or venture capitals. Post crisis is an indicator variable that is assigned
a value of one for the year 2005 and after and a value of zero otherwise. The variable Family-owned firms*post crisis is an interaction
term of family-owned and post crisis variables. Age shows the age of each firm. Including year and firm fixed effects are specified in
each estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, and the standard error appears in parentheses.
Difference in Ln Revenue Difference in Ln Employment
family-owned firms*post crisis -0.0011 0.0556
(0.0190) (0.0430)
ysd 0.4472 0.1877
ymean .3041 .0542
ar2 .5169 .3794
N 3424 785
year fixed effect yes yes
firm fixed effect yes yes
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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